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EXCUSES, EXCUSES: NEUTRAL EXPLANATIONS
UNDER BATSON V. KENTUCKY
Michael J. Raphael*
Edward J. Ungvarsky**
The legal struggle for racial justice in the United States
has always been in part a struggle to determine how best to
achieve racial equality. In 1986, in Batson v. Kentucky,' the
United States Supreme Court attempted to curb racial dis-
crimination in the use of peremptory challenges to strike
potential members of a jury. The Court mandated procedures
for determining whether a prosecutor had struck members of
the venire because of their race.2 The procedures furnished in
Batson are quite general, however, and lower courts have
used a variety of standards in implementing them. This
Article examines how lower courts have handled one impor-
tant Batson procedure-the "neutral explanation"3 that prose-
cutors must offer to explain their strikes"-and suggests how
the treatment of neutral explanations can be improved.
In Part I of this Article, we provide some background infor-
mation necessary to explain our research and analysis. We
briefly explain the role of peremptory challenges in the venire
process, the precursors to Batson, and the Batson decision
itself. In Part II, we explain our methodology for analyzing the
lower court cases. In Part III, we discuss and analyze our
research concerning how courts have applied the neutral expla-
nation requirement of the Batson decision, and we present the
* B.A. 1990, Rice University; J.D. 1993, Yale Law School. Law Clerk to the
Honorable Nathaniel R. Jones, United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
** B.A. 1990, Wesleyan University; J.D. 1993, Yale Law School. Law Clerk to
the Honorable Frank M. Johnson, Jr., United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit.
The authors would like to thank Stephen Bright, Pamela Davis, Drew Days, Amy
Jeffress, Alex Oh, Eric Schnapper, Paul Sonn, and Jonathan Zasloff for their
assistance.
1. 476 US. 79 (1986).
2. Recently, the Supreme Court extended Batson to peremptory challenges
based on a venireperson's gender. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419,
(1994). We anticipate that courts will apply current Batson procedures for race-
based strikes to those allegedly based upon gender; thus, we believe our discussion
herein also will apply to procedures implementing J.E.B.
3. The term is discussed and explained infra Part I.B.
4. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 97-98.
229
230 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 27:1
results of our research by dividing the explanations into
various categories. Finally, in Parts IV and V, we provide a
new approach for improving the treatment of neutral expla-
nations, which attempts to remedy the problems we find with
the current approach.
I. BACKGROUND
The process of jury selection is governed by statute in each
American jurisdiction. Though there are many differences in
the particulars, each jurisdiction follows the same general
process. First, a list of eligible jurors is compiled, usually
from voter registration lists. Next, a group of those persons is
randomly selected from the list and given notice that they are
to appear for jury duty at a particular time. This group of
jurors is known as the venire.5 Before a trial, in a process
called "voir dire," attorneys for each party may question the
venirepersons.6 A juror7 may be removed "for cause" if she
demonstrates by her answers an inability to pass impartial
judgment in the case or that she is otherwise unfit or incom-
petent to serve.8 For instance, a juror who says she could not
apply the law at issue because she disagrees with it, or a juror
who says she is prejudiced against a criminal defendant, easily
could be dismissed for cause. All jurisdictions also allow
attorneys peremptory challenges for use against jurors whom
they wish to dismiss, but who have not displayed characteristics
that support a for-cause challenge.9 Either method of dismissal
is normally characterized as "striking the juror." Traditionally,
attorneys do not have to offer a reason for exercising a
5. Each jurisdiction allows certain people to be excused before sitting on the
venire, due, for example, to their profession or because sitting on a jury would cause
them undue hardship. For an explanation of how racial bias can enter the system
before the venire is seated, see Developments in the Law-Race and the Criminal
Process, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1472, 1562-64 (1988).
6. In some jurisdictions, the judge participates in the voir dire questioning.
7. This Article defines "juror" to include empaneled jurors and venirepersons,
and those terms are used interchangeably.
8. See 50 C.J.S. Juries § 269 (1947) (grounds for challenges for cause).
9. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (1988) (providing for peremptory challenges in federal
civil actions); FED. R. CRIM. P. 24 (providing for peremptory challenges in federal
criminal actions); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 231 (West 1994) (providing for peremptory
challenges in civil and criminal cases); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 768.12-768.13 (West 1982)
(providing for peremptory challenges in criminal cases).
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peremptory challenge. While the number of challenges for
cause is unlimited, the number of peremptories each party
may exercise is limited by statute, usually depending upon
the type of case.'
A. Batson's Precursors
Batson" was not the first case in which the Supreme Court
applied the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment 12 to address the problem of racial discrimination
against jurors. In Strauder v. West Virginia,3 a post-Civil
War case, the Court held that states could not expressly
exclude black citizens from venire pools. 4 In Strauder, a
West Virginia statute required that venire pools be composed
solely of white male citizens.' 5 Because members of trial
juries are chosen from these pools, the statute's exclusion of
blacks effectively meant that no blacks could serve on a jury.
Subsequently, the plaintiff in Strauder, who was black, was
convicted of murder by an all-white jury. The Supreme Court
found that the statute offended equal protection by contra-
vening the "very idea of a jury [as] a body of men composed of
the peers or equals of the person whose rights it is selected
or summoned to determine; that is, of his neighbors, fellows,
associates, [and] persons having the same legal status in
society as that which he holds." 6 Thus, Strauder held that
the systematic exclusion of blacks from petit juries 17 was
unconstitutional. After Strauder, several Supreme Court
decisions further elucidated the constitutional bar against
10. A list of the number of peremptory challenges allowed to each side in each
state can be found in JON M. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES 282-84
(1977). They range from as high as 20 or more per side in felony cases, especially
those involving capital punishment, to as low as two or three in civil cases. Id.
11. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
12. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall.., deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
13. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
14. Id. at 310.
15. W. Va. LAWS, ch. XCVII § 1 (1873).
16. 100 U.S. at 308.
17. Petit juries are trial juries, usually composed of 12 persons, as distin-
guished from grand juries, which are larger groups that decide whether to indict a
criminal suspect. See BLACK' S LAW DICTIONARY, 856 (6th ed. 1990).
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excluding minorities from the jury pool.'"
The Supreme Court first applied the Equal Protection
Clause to the exercise of peremptory challenges during the
1960s. In Swain v. Alabama,9 Robert Swain, a black man
who was convicted of rape by an all-white jury and sentenced
to death, alleged that the prosecution willfully used its pe-
remptory strikes to exclude all blacks from the jury.2" The
Supreme Court advanced racial equality in principle, holding
that although "a Negro defendant is not entitled to a jury
containing members of his race, a State's purposeful or delib-
erate denial to Negroes on account of race of participation as
jurors in the administration of justice violates the Equal
Protection Clause."'" In implementing this important princi-
ple, however, the Court came up shamefully short. For a
defendant to prove state discrimination, the Swain Court re-
quired the defendant to show that peremptory strikes were
used systematically by the prosecution to exclude blacks from
all juries over a period of years.22 Stating that peremptory
challenges are presumed to have been exercised fairly,23 the
Court held that a defendant could present a prima facie case
of discrimination only by showing that the "prosecutor ... in
case after case, whatever the circumstances, whatever the
crime and whoever the defendant or the victim may be, is
responsible for" striking all potential black jurors.24 Thus, the
Court focused the judicial inquiry not upon the reasons prof-
fered by the prosecutor for his strikes in the instant case but
rather upon all the cases tried by the prosecutor. 25 To prove a
18. See, e.g., Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 397 (1881) (rejecting the argu-
ment that excluding blacks was justified because the entire population of blacks
was unqualified for jury duty); Carter v. Texas, 177 U.S. 442, 447 (1900) (prohibit-
ing the systematic exclusion of blacks from grand juries under the Equal Protection
Clause); Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463, 469 (1947) (holding that a jury selec-
tion plan that has completely excluded members of a racial group over a protracted
period establishes a strong presumption that the instant jury was selected through
impermissible racial exclusion); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 537 (1975)
(prohibiting systematic exclusion or automatic exemption of women from criminal
jury venires based solely on gender); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 495 (1977)
("Once the defendant has shown substantial underrepresentation of his group [in a
grand jury], he has made out a prima facie case of discriminatory purpose. . .
19. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
20. See id. at 203.
21. Id. at 203-04.
22. Id. at 224.
23. Id. at 222.
24. Id. at 223.
25. Id. at 227-28.
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Swain violation, then, a defendant had to gather evidence not
only about his own case but also about the prosecutor's pat-
tern of behavior in numerous other cases as well. Not sur-
prisingly, given this difficult and expensive burden, Robert
Swain could not prove a constitutional violation, despite the
fact that no black had served on a petit jury in the county
where his case was tried in at least fifteen years.2" The test
articulated in Swain proved unable to curb prosecutorial
discrimination in the exercise of peremptory challenges,
suggesting the need for a new approach.27
B. Batson's Framework
Batson attempted to better address unconstitutional prose-
cutorial discrimination by establishing a two-part procedure
for determining whether a prosecutor had used peremptory
challenges to exclude a juror on the basis of her race. 28 First,
the criminal defendant must establish a prima facie case of
purposeful discrimination in striking a member of the veni-
re.29 Second, if such a case is established, the prosecutor
must rebut the inference of discrimination by proffering a
"neutral explanation" for the strikes that is specific to the
circumstances of the case at hand.3 °
In presenting a prima facie case, the defendant may estab-
lish an inference of discrimination "solely on evidence con-
cerning the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges at
the defendant's trial."3 ' The defendant must satisfy a three-
pronged test to establish the inference. First, the defendant
"must show that he is a member of a cognizable racial group,
and that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges
26. Id. at 205.
27. The standard developed in Swain was characterized by the Batson Court as
a "crippling burden of proof." Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 92 (1986). For
academic criticisms of Swain, see Note, Limiting the Peremptory Challenge: Repre-
sentation of Groups on Petit Juries, 86 YALE L.J. 1715 (1977); Foy R. Devine, Com-
ment, Swain v. Alabama: A Constitutional Blueprint for the Perpetuation of the All-
White Jury, 52 VA. L. REV. 1157 (1966).
28. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 93-98.
29. Id. at 93-94.
30. Id. at 97-98.
31. Id. at 96.
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to remove from the venire members of the defendant's race."32
Second, the defendant may rely on the fact "that peremptory
challenges ... permit[] 'those to discriminate who are of a
mind to discriminate.' 33 Lastly, "the defendant must show
that these facts and any other relevant circumstances raise
an inference that the prosecutor used that practice to exclude
the veniremen from the petit jury on account of their race."34
Once a defendant successfully raises an inference of dis-
crimination, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to offer a
neutral explanation for the challenges. The Batson Court
provided only minimal guidance regarding what constitutes an
adequate neutral explanation. On the one hand, the prose-
cutor's explanation need not be so substantial as to "rise to the
level justifying [the] exercise of a challenge for cause."35 On the
other hand, "the prosecutor may not rebut the defendant's
prima facie case of discrimination by stating merely that he
challenged jurors of the defendant's race on the assumption-or
his intuitive judgment-that they would be partial to the
defendant because of their shared race."36 Furthermore, the
prosecutor may not rebut the defendant's case simply by
claiming that he had no discriminatory motive in exercising
his challenges. 37 Batson gave no other express guidance
regarding which explanations are acceptable and which are
not.
II. METHODOLOGY OF PROJECT
We examined all published lower court cases that cited the
1986 Batson decision. Using the Shepard's citator system
available on the LEXIS computer database service, we re-
trieved over 2000 such cases through January 1992. Of these,
a total of 824 cases directly applied the Batson procedures,
including 129 federal cases and 695 state cases. The 129
federal cases included 115 Court of Appeals and 14 District
Court opinions. The 695 state cases also included primarily
32. Id. (citation omitted).
33. Id. (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953)).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 97.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 98.
Explanations Under Batson v. Kentucky
appellate decisions, as few state trial court opinions are
published.
Thus, our sample consists of cases from the first five years
after Batson. Because new lower court cases dealing with
Batson are issued regularly, this collection of cases is not
meant to be used as an up-to-date exposition of the law of
any particular jurisdiction. Rather, we deliberately limited
our sample so that we could analyze broadly how various
courts employ the Batson procedures. We sought to determine
whether Batson is achieving its goal of eliminating racial
discrimination in jury selection. Our research focuses on
determining how lower courts have evaluated neutral expla-
nations in the absence of more extensive instructions from
the Supreme Court.
To explain their strikes, prosecutors frequently offer more
than one explanation. The cases rarely identify which reasons
the prosecutors, defense attorneys, and trial and appellate
judges thought were most important. Our research includes
both cases involving just one clearly articulated, independent
factor and cases in which more than one reason for excluding
a juror was given. In the next Part, we provide and analyze
our findings.
III. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF NEUTRAL EXPLANATIONS
A. Overview of the Problem
A prosecutor who wishes to rebut the prima facie case does
not face a significant challenge.38 In our data, only a small
percentage of the neutral explanations for peremptory strikes
were rejected. Indeed, those explanations that were rejected
often involved the clearest cases of Batson violations, such as
38. Throughout this paper, we have chosen to use as our paradigm the original
Batson situation of a criminal case in which a black defendant challenges strikes of
black jurors by a prosecutor. See id. at 82-83. In more recent cases, the Court has
extended Batson both to the exercise of peremptory challenges by criminal defen-
dants, Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992), to peremptory challenges in
civil cases, Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991), to white
defendants' challenges to prosecutorial strikes of black jurors, Powers v. Ohio, 499
U.S. 400 (1991), and to strikes allegedly based upon gender, J.E.B. v. Alabama ex
rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994). We do not address the merits of so extending
Batson, and we refer to the original Batson paradigm only for ease of discussion.
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prosecutors who explained that they struck the juror based
on race39 or prosecutors who gave no reason for striking the
juror.40 Opponents of racial discrimination, however, cannot
take much comfort from the treatment of even these clear
cases of prosecutorial abuse because there are a number of
cases in which courts accepted as a neutral explanation the
prosecutor's statement that she struck a juror because,
among other reasons, the juror was black,4' or the prosecu-
tor's offering no explanation at all.42 These cases intimate
that courts are often uncritical in evaluating neutral explana-
tions. In fact, our research demonstrates that in almost any
situation a prosecutor can readily craft an acceptable neutral
explanation to justify striking black jurors because of their
race. This is especially true when only a single or a few ju-
rors are struck because it is less obvious that a pattern of
striking blacks is involved.
The ease with which Batson's neutral explanation test can
be satisfied is illustrated further in the following hypothetical
example. Suppose that a prosecutor has struck a juror named
Pat because Pat is black. Imagine further that the defendant
has established a prima facie case of racial discrimination
39. See, e.g., Goggins v. State, 529 So. 2d 649, 651-52 (Miss. 1988) (deeming
invalid a strike based on the belief that blacks are more favorable to black defen-
dants); State v. Blackmon, 744 S.W.2d 482, 486 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (same); see also
Owens v. State, 531 So. 2d 22, 26 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987) (rejecting the trial court's
conclusion that a prosecutor's consideration of a jurors' race among other factors is
"race-neutral"); State v. Holman, 759 S.W.2d 902, 903 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (same).
40. See, e.g., United States v. Battle, 836 F.2d 1084, 1085-86 (8th Cir. 1987)
(holding that the trial court erred in construing Batson as not requiring the prose-
cutor to state a reason for the contested peremptory challenges); United States v.
Cunningham, 713 F. Supp. 165, 170 (M.D.N.C. 1988); Exparte Williams, 571 So. 2d
987, 990 (Ala. 1990); Williams v. State, 507 So. 2d 566, 568 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987).
For cases in which the trial court failed to ask the prosecutor for an explanation,
see People v. Snow, 746 P.2d 452, 457 (Cal. 1987); Reynolds v. State, 576 So. 2d
1300, 1301 (Fla. 1991); Thompson v. State, 548 So. 2d 198, 202 (Fla. 1989).
41. See, e.g., Lee v. State, 747 S.W.2d 57, 59 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (accepting the
prosecutor's explanation that he struck a juror because he was a black male within
10 years of the defendant's age); see also United States v. Tindle, 860 F.2d 125, 129
(4th Cir. 1988) (accepting a prosecutor's explanation of similar appearance in a case
involving a defense of mistaken identity), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1114 (1989); Scales
v. State, 539 So. 2d 1074, 1074 (Ala. 1988) (accepting an explanation of similar age,
appearance, and background to the defendant); Branch v. State, 526 So. 2d 605, 606
(Ala. Crim. App. 1986) (accepting an explanation of similar age and appearance and
possible former relationship with the defendant).
42. See, e.g., State v. Wylie, 525 A.2d 528, 534-35 (Conn. App. Ct.) cert. denied,
528 A.2d 1154 (Conn. 1987); People v. Mack, 538 N.E.2d 1107, 1113 (111. 1989), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 1093 (1990); State v. Butler, 795 S.W.2d 680, 687 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 1990).
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under Batson. At this point, the prosecutor has the opportu-
nity to produce a neutral explanation as to why Pat was chal-
lenged. In virtually any situation, an intelligent prosecutor
can produce a plausible neutral explanation for striking Pat
despite the prosecutor's having acted on racial bias. The
prosecutor can show either that Pat has served on a jury
before, or that Pat has never served on a jury before.43 The
prosecutor can explain that Pat is young or that Pat is old."
He can say that he does not want a juror with Pat's occupa-
tion for this case,45 or that Pat is unemployed.46 If Pat or
Pat's relatives have had any involvement with law enforce-
ment in the past, the prosecutor can exclude Pat regardless
of whether the involvement has some connection to Pat.47 The
prosecutor can declare that something in Pat's demeanor is
bothersome. 4' The prosecutor can even focus on a random
aspect of the juror's character or past dealings, even if it only
remotely relates to some aspect of the case or to the legal
process in general.49 Moreover, the best strategy for the pros-
ecutor is to offer a combination of the above rationales for
striking Pat. Consequently, given the current case law, a
prosecutor who wishes to offer a pretext for a race-based
strike is unlikely to encounter difficulty in crafting a neutral
explanation.
B. Analysis of Neutral Explanations
In this section, we set forth the results of our examination
of lower court decisions. Finding that the same types of
43. See infra Part III.B.12.
44. See infra Part III.B.1.
45. See infra Part III.B.2.
46. See infra Part III.B.3.
47. See infra Part III.B.11.
48. See infra Part III.B.5.
49. See, e.g., State v. Wylie, 525 A.2d 528, 534 (Conn. App. Ct.) (accepting the
prosecutor's explanation that the juror had stopped once or twice at the store where
the crime occurred), cert. denied, 528 A.2d 1154 (Conn. 1987); People v. Mack, 538
N.E.2d 1107, 1112 (Ill. 1989) (accepting the prosecutor's explanation that the juror
knew some lawyers and a judge in the same courthouse), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1093
(1990); Chisolm v. State, 529 So. 2d 635, 638 (Miss. 1988) (accepting the prosecu-
tor's explanation that the juror's husband worked at a radio station that once aired
a documentary unfavorable to law enforcement).
One court maintains that Batson does not "preclude exercise of a peremptory
challenge for a non-race based reason that objective and fair-minded persons might
regard as absurd." Chisolm, 529 So. 2d at 639.
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explanations occur repeatedly, we have organized them into
twelve categories. Although they do not encompass all possi-
ble explanations, these categories account for a solid majority
of the explanations we reviewed. In our study, courts accept-
ed the vast majority of the explanations offered. Nonethe-
less, we spend a disproportionate amount of space discussing
the rejected explanations because those cases typically em-
phasize the most important concerns in evaluating each
category. By this discussion, we do not mean to give the
impression that courts in our study often rejected explana-
tions.
1. Age-Courts routinely accept explanations from prose-
cutors who say they struck a juror based upon the juror's age.
Though explanations based upon youth are far more common
than those based upon old age, many examples of both exist.
The willingness of courts to accept age-based explanations is
well-illustrated in State v. Smith,0 where the prosecutor
struck four blacks and explained that two were struck be-
cause they were the same age as the defendant, and that two
were struck because they were old.5' One of the older jurors
was in her early fifties and the other was in her early sixties.
Even though the prosecutor failed to strike a white
venireperson who was over sixty years old, the court upheld
the prosecutor's explanations of the other strikes.52 Currin v.
State53 provides another example of a court upholding a pros-
ecutor's strikes of black jurors both because some were young
and because some were old.
In striking young blacks, prosecutors often maintain that
young jurors are particularly sympathetic to the defendant,
who often is young as well. For instance, in Thompson v.
State,54 the court accepted the prosecutor's explanation that
he struck three jurors because they approximated the defen-
dant's age.55 At times, prosecutors also claim that a
50. 791 S.W.2d 744 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).
51. Id. at 750.
52. Id.
53. 535 So. 2d 221 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988).
54. 390 S.E.2d 253 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990).
55. Id. at 255. For additional examples of prosecutors striking young venire
members because they would be sympathetic to a young defendant, see Stanley v.
State, 582 A.2d 532, 535 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1990) (nineteen and twenty-year-olds);
Grady v. State, 730 S.W.2d 191, 194 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (a thirty-two-year-old); see
also Wagner v. State, 555 So. 2d 1141, 1143-44 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989) (four blacks
of similar age to the defendant); Ricks v. State, 542 So. 2d 289, 290 (Ala. Crim. App.
Explanations Under Batson v. Kentucky
venireperson's age makes her unable to judge the evidence
competently.56 Only rarely have prosecutors attempted to link
juror age to a specific element of the case being tried, al-
though some instances do exist. In one trial for drug posses-
sion, the prosecutor claimed to have struck two black jurors
aged eighteen and twenty-one because young jurors are more
likely to tolerate drug use.5" In one child molestation case,
the prosecutor claimed to have struck a childless forty-year-
old woman because having no children at that age indicated
that she probably could not relate to the case.58
A few courts have rejected explanations based upon age. In
several of these cases, courts did so because the prosecutor did
not strike white venire members who should have been dis-
missed on the same age-based rationale. For instance, in one
rape case, the prosecutor claimed to have struck a thirty-four-
year-old black male because his age indicated that he would
be unable to appreciate the gravity of the offense.5 9 The Illinois
Supreme Court rejected this explanation, however, because the
prosecutor had not challenged an eighteen-year-old white
male.60 In the same case, the prosecutor had struck two black
men, aged sixty-three and sixty-nine, allegedly because their
advanced age would have impeded their understanding of the
1987) (two jurors of approximately the same age as the defendant); Orr v. State, 375
S.E.2d 669, 670 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988) (allowing the prosecutor to strike a black
because of his similarity in age to the defendant); State v. Thompson, 516 So. 2d
349, 354 (La. 1987) (allowing the prosecutor to strike the mother of children the
defendant's age), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 871 (1988); Taitano v. Commonwealth, 358
S.E.2d 590, 591 (Va. Ct. App. 1987) (allowing the prosecutor to strike three males of
the same approximate age as defendant who also lived near the defendant).
56. See People v. Kindelan, 572 N.E.2d 1138, 1143 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (allowing
a prosecutor's explanation that a twenty-four-year-old black woman would be
unable to sit in judgment and express opinions because of her youth); Williams-Bey
v. State, 765 S.W.2d 41, 42 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (allowing the prosecutor's explana-
tion that an elderly woman would have been unable to understand the evidence
despite no questioning as to whether the woman actually could understand the
required concepts).
57. Chambliss v. Commonwealth, 386 S.E.2d 478, 478 (Va. Ct. App. 1989).
58. Bess v. State, 369 S.E.2d 784, 786 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988). In Bass, although
the court noted that the voir dire only produced evidence that the woman was
single and not that she was childless, it upheld the dismissal. Id.
59. People v. McDonald, 530 N.E.2d 1351, 1356 (111. 1988).
60. Id. at 1358. Interestingly, the prosecutor testified that young, single males
are the worst jurors in a rape case, and testified further that he defined "young" to
include only people in their early twenties or younger. Id. at 1356. By the prosecutor's
own testimony, then, he should have struck the eighteen-year-old white male and had
much less reason to challenge the thirty-four-year-old black male.
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case.6 ' Again the court rejected this explanation because the
prosecutor had nevertheless permitted a sixty-seven-year-old
white man to serve on the jury.62
Other cases have rejected the age-based explanation because
the prosecutor made no attempt to explore the issue of age bias
when questioning the venirepersons.63 United States v. Chin-
chilla64 implicitly placed upon the prosecutor the burden of
demonstrating that an age-based strike is valid by presenting
a record of the challenged juror's age.65 In that case, the court
refused to consider age-based explanations because the jurors
had not stated their ages for the record and no other evidence
of their ages was present.66
2. Occupation-Prosecutors commonly explain that they
struck a juror because the juror's occupation may adversely
affect the juror's evaluation of the facts presented in the case.
The three occupations that most often provide a basis for
neutral explanations are social worker,67 teacher,68 and govern-
61. Id. at 1359.
62. Id. In several other cases, courts also rejected age-based explanations because
the prosecutor had inconsistently applied an age rationale. See Powell v. State, 548
So. 2d 590,593 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988), affd, 548 So. 2d 605 (Ala. 1989); Floyd v. State,
539 So. 2d 357, 363 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987); State v. Williams, 746 S.W.2d 148, 149
(Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
63. See Avery v. State, 545 So. 2d 123, 127 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988); Jackson v.
Commonwealth, 380 S.E.2d 1, 6 (Va. Ct. App. 1989); cf. Williams v. State, 548 So. 2d
501,506 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988) (rejecting the explanation of age bias because the state
had failed to establish actual bias stemming from similarity in age to the defendants).
64. 874 F.2d 695 (9th Cir. 1989).
65. Id. at 698.
66. Id.
67. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarado, 923 F.2d 253, 255 (2d Cir. 1991) (accepting
the explanation that a social worker might sympathize with the defendant); United
States v. Wilson, 867 F.2d 486, 487-88 (8th Cir.) (accepting the explanation that the
juror was a juvenile court social worker who worked with police officers and defense
attorneys), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 827 (1989); Smith v. State, 531 So. 2d 1245, 1248
(Ala. Crim. App. 1987) (accepting the explanation that the juror was a social worker
who had voted to acquit a criminal defendant in a previous trial); Thompson v. State,
390 S.E.2d 253,254 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990) (accepting the explanation that a social worker
would tend to identify with persons of low socioeconomic status such as the defendant);
Foster v. State, 374 S.E.2d 188, 192 (Ga. 1988) (accepting the explanation that social
workers would sympathize with criminal defendants, especially in the sentencing phase
of a capital punishment case), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1085 (1989); People v. Buckley,
522 N.E.2d 86, 92 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (accepting the dismissal of a social worker
supervisor despite the fact that the prosecutor had stated that he wanted jurors
employed in positions of authority).
68. See, e.g., People v. Harris, 544 N.E.2d 357, 381 (Ill. 1989) (accepting the
explanation that a juror was excluded because he was a former teacher and was
married to a teacher), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1018 (1990); Rasco v. State, 739 S.W.2d
437, 439 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (accepting the explanation that a black teacher was
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ment worker.6 9 Prosecutors have explained successfully that
they struck jurors for employment in virtually any line of
work: comptrollers,7 ° cooks,7' librarians,72 grocery clerks,73
student counselors,74 missionaries,75 students,76 scientists,77
nurses,78 ministers,79 security guards,80 pharmacists,8 ' and
struck because in her job she was used to hearing excuses). But see McGahee v. State,
554 So. 2d 454, 460-61 (Ala. Crim. App.) (finding the explanation that teachers were
of special concern "due to their social approach to dealing with people" not neutral
on its own), affd on other grounds, 554 So. 2d 473 (Ala. 1989).
69. See, e.g., Barfield v. Orange County, 911 F.2d 644,648 (1 lth Cir. 1990) (accept-
ing the explanation that a school board employee would generally favor employees),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2263 (1991); United States v. Johnson, 905 F.2d 222, 223 (8th
Cir.) (accepting the strikes of black and white Division of Family Services employees
on the belief that they would sympathize with the defendant who was involved in an
escape from a halfway house), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 924 (1990); United States v.
Biaggi, 705 F. Supp. 867, 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (accepting the strike of a sanitation
department police officer for fear of sympathy towards the defendant who was a former
law enforcement officer); Simpkins v. State, 558 A.2d 816, 820 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1989) (accepting the dismissal of a Social Security claims examiner).
70. See, e.g., People v. Peters, 494 N.E.2d 853, 861 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (accepting
the prosecutor's explanation that comptrollers are prone to detail and order and that
such people do not make good jurors in criminal cases).71. See, e.g., People v. Buckley, 522 N.E.2d 86, 92 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (accepting
the prosecutor's dismissal of a cook because her job was not "a type of worldly
occupation where someone would be exposed to a large variety of things").
72. See, e.g., Levy v. State, 749 S.W.2d 176, 178 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (accepting
the prosecutor's explanation that he wanted jurors with jobs that put them in
contact with people).
73. See, e.g., State v. Reyes, 788 P.2d 1239, 1242 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989) (accepting
the prosecutor's explanation that the juror would sympathize with a defendant
involved "in a working-class barroom fight").
74. See, e.g., State v. Jackson, 368 S.E.2d 838, 841 (N.C. 1988) (accepting the
prosecutor's explanation that a juror who had worked as a student counselor at a
university would be sympathetic to the defendant), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1110
(1989).
75. See, e.g., United States v. Biaggi, 705 F. Supp. 867, 869-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)
(accepting the prosecutor's explanation that the juror would be too sympathetic to
the testimony concerning the defendant's contributions to religious charities in a
case involving tax evasion).
76. See, e.g., State v. Richburg, 403 S.E.2d 315, 317 (S.C. 1991) (accepting the
explanation that college students are 'more tolerant towards drugs" in a drug
possession case).
77. See, e.g., Branch v. State, 526 So. 2d 605, 606-07 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986)
(allowing dismissal based upon the concern that a scientist would demand a scien-
tific presentation of the evidence).
78. See, e.g., Pritchett v. State, 548 So. 2d 509, 510 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988)
(allowing the strike without requiring an explanation).
79. See, e.g., Lockett v. State, 517 So. 2d 1346, 1350-51 (Miss. 1987) (accepting
the explanation that preachers are too forgiving).
80. See, e.g., State v. Hood, 745 S.W.2d 785, 787 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (accepting
the explanation that security guards commonly question police procedures).
81. See, e.g., United States v. Rodrequez, 859 F.2d 1321, 1325 (8th Cir. 1988)
(accepting the explanation that because a juror was a pharmacist he 'could possibly
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homemakers. 2 Furthermore, jurors occasionally are struck
because they are married or related to someone who has a
particular kind of job.83
Although in several of the above cases the prosecutor
struck a juror even though his occupation was unrelated to
the case, 4 prosecutors frequently explain that a juror was
struck because of work related to law enforcement. In United
States v. Briscoe, 5 for example, the prosecutor was permitted
to strike a juror who worked at a youth detention center,
under the theory that the juror might be sympathetic toward
criminal defendants.8 6 Other prosecutors have been allowed,
at least by trial courts, to strike jurors who were employed by
criminal defense law firms, 7 by the courts, 8 by establish-
ments frequented by criminal offenders, 9 by a police crime
laboratory, ° and by a city jail.9
Moreover, trial attorneys sometimes explain that they
struck a juror because of the relationship between the juror's
job and the particular case being tried. For instance, a juror
who worked as a cardiology technologist was dismissed in a
civil suit in which the plaintiff claimed that the defendant
police officer's use of excessive force in arresting the plaintiff
had aggravated his heart condition.92 In a rape case, a juror
form an individual opinion on the narcotics charge"), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1058
(1989).
82. See, e.g., United States v. Allen, 666 F. Supp. 847, 852 (E.D. Va. 1987), aff'd
sub nom. United States v. Harrell, 847 F.2d 138, 139 (4th Cir.) (accepting the
explanation that the prosecutor wanted jurors with jobs), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 944
(1988).
83. See, e.g., State v. Brown, 522 So. 2d 1110, 1114 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (exclud-
ing the son of a minister); State v. Harris, 520 So. 2d 911, 914 (La. Ct. App. 1987)
(excluding the wife of a pastor); Davis v. State, 551 So. 2d 165, 172 (Miss. 1989)
(excluding a woman because, among other reasons, she was the wife of a preacher);
State v. Kilgore, 771 S.W.2d 57, 63 (Mo. 1989) (excluding the sister of a prison
worker); State v. Walton, 418 N.W.2d 589, 593 (Neb. 1988) (excluding the spouse of
a social worker).
84. See, e.g., Pritchett v. State, 548 So. 2d 509, 510 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988);
State v. Jackson, 368 S.E.2d at 838, 839 (N.C. 1988).
85. 896 F.2d 1476 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 863 (1990).
86. Id. at 1488.
87. See, e.g., People v. Mack, 538 N.E.2d 1107, 1112 (111. 1989), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 1093 (1990).
88. See, e.g., Ricks v. State, 542 So. 2d 289, 290 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987).
89. See, e.g., United States v. Tindle, 860 F.2d 125, 129 (4th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 490 U.S. 1114 (1989).
90. See, e.g., People v. Walker, 547 N.E.2d 1036, 1038 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989).
91. See, e.g., State v. Hall, 785 S.W.2d 652, 656 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).
92. Soler v. McHenry, 771 F. Supp. 252, 254-55 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
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who worked as a motel maid was dismissed in part because
prosecutors reasoned that she might be too quick to believe
that the victim consented.93 In another case, an engineer who
worked in the police department was excused because the
prosecutor felt that he would not take police testimony as
seriously as someone who did not work with police.94 Finally,
in a case against a truck driver charged with drunk driving
and killing a motorcyclist, the prosecutor dismissed five
jurors, claiming that they or their relatives drove trucks.95
Courts have rejected several job-based explanations,
however, particularly when they discover that white jurors
with the same jobs as the dismissed black juror were not
excused. In People v. McDonald,96 the prosecutor dismissed
two spouses of teachers, asserting that teachers tend to think
independently and ignore counsels' arguments, and that
teachers are "too precise" to understand circumstantial
evidence.97 The prosecutor also struck a nurse due to her
medical knowledge.9" Nevertheless, the court rejected both
explanations because the prosecutor had let a white teacher
and a white nurse's assistant sit on the jury. The court
reasoned that such a "patent inconsistency" was unac-
ceptable. 99 In another case, the prosecutor claimed to have
excused a juror who did detail work with photography be-
cause work with details was an undesirable characteristic in
the particular case.100 In rejecting the explanation, the Kan-
sas Supreme Court noted that the prosecutor had not dis-
missed white jurors whose jobs also involved a great -deal of
work with details. 10 1
Some courts have rejected explanations where prosecutors
made no effort to determine whether a dismissed juror actually
93. People v. Jones, 559 N.E.2d 112, 115-16 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
94. Rodgers v. State, 725 S.W.2d 477, 480 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987).
95. Pollard v. State, 549 So. 2d 593, 595-96 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989). For other
examples of occupation-based explanations in which the occupation bore some
relation to the case at bar, see United States v. Tindle, 860 F.2d 125, 129 (4th Cir.
1988) (same occupation as two government witnesses); United States v. Biaggi, 673
F. Supp. 96, 104-06 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (place of employment had ties to the defendant
congressman).
96. 530 N.E.2d 1351 (Ill. 1988).
97. Id. at 1355-56.
98. Id. at 1355.
99. Id. at 1358-59.
100. State v. Belnavis, 787 P.2d 1172, 1174 (Kan. 1990).
101. Belnavis, 787 P.2d at 1174. The prosecutor did not challenge a sign lan-
guage interpreter, computer technician, controller, or secretary. Id.
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possessed the traits alleged to characterize members of the
juror's occupation. For example, in Slappy v. State,"2 the
prosecutor excused two black teachers because he felt that
teachers were too liberal.103 When the defense counsel noted
that he had not excused a white teacher for that reason, the
prosecutor said that the white teacher had been in the army
and therefore was less likely to be liberal. 104 The Florida
Appellate Court rejected the prosecutor's explanation, holding
that, to combat racial discrimination, the reviewing court
must go beyond the facial neutrality of the reasonableness of
the explanation. 10 5 The court noted the vagueness of the
"liberal" characteristic, as well as the tenuous connection
between teaching or serving in the army and being
"liberal."1 6 Specifically, the prosecutor asked no questions to
determine whether the teachers excused actually maintained
"liberal" views.
10 7
Using related logic, the California Supreme Court stated
that striking a black juror for being a truck driver was unjus-
tified without some demonstration that the individual
embodied some undesired characteristic that truck drivers as
a group tend to share.'l 8 Also, in State v. Payton,'0 9 a Mis-
souri appellate court refused to accept the prosecutor's ex-
planation that a juror was struck for being a liquor store
owner who probably knew police officers because the
prosecutor never inquired whether the juror in fact knew any
police officers." 0
Two courts have rejected occupational explanations where
the occupation was unconnected to the case at hand. In Mayes
v. State,"' the court rejected the prosecutor's explanation that
102. 503 So. 2d 350 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
103. Id. at 352.
104. Id..
105. Id. at 355-56.
106. Id. at 355.
107. Id. Furthermore, the prosecutor failed to demonstrate how a juror's liberal-
ism would prove "antagonistic to the State's interest" in this case. Id.
108. People v. Turner, 726 P.2d 102, 108-09 (Cal. 1986). The court examined the
record and found in the juror "no lack of intelligence whatever," and therefore
rejected the inference that the truck driver would not be intelligent enough to serve
on the jury. Id.
109. 747 S.W.2d 290 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (involving one defendant who was a
police officer).
110. Id. at 293.
111. 550 So. 2d 496 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
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he struck a juror because she worked as a nurse.'12 The court
vacated the conviction, holding that a prosecutor may strike
a juror based upon occupation only if the occupation has
some relationship to the immediate case.113 In another case,
the prosecutor claimed to have struck a black nurse because
the prosecutor's past experience indicated that, in general,
nurses feel compassion for defendants." 4 The court rejected
this explanation, however, stating that the prosecutor's
reason for the strike must be related to the particular case,
and not based merely upon such past experience." 5
3. Unemployment-A common explanation for excusing
jurors is their lack of employment, and courts in all but one
of the cases in our sample accepted this explanation when
offered. Typically, prosecutors simply explain that the juror is
unemployed." 6 Prosecutors occasionally attempt to explain
why the juror's unemployment is relevant to the particular
case. For instance, in Chisolm v. State,"7 the prosecutor
excused five unemployed blacks, explaining that they might
sympathize with the defendant, who also was unemployed."'
Prosecutors commonlyjustify dismissing unemployed jurors by
claiming that they lack roots in the community." 9 Prosecutors
sometimes imply that the juror's proclaimed unemployment
hints that she may be earning money illegally. For example,
112. Id. at 498.
113. Id. The court also stated that the prosecutor left a white juror who worked
in the medical profession on the jury. Id. ("A challenge based on reasons equally
applicable to jurors who were accepted tends to show that the reasons relied upon
in the exercise of the peremptory challenge were pretextual.").
114. State v. Butler, 731 S.W.2d 265, 271 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
115. Id. at 272. Additionally, the prosecutor had allowed a white person who
worked for the American Nurses Association to serve on the jury. Id.
116. For examples of accepted unemployment explanations from a variety of
jurisdictions, see United States v. Ferguson, 935 F.2d 862, 864-66 (7th Cir. 1991),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 907 (1992); United States v. Jackson, 914 F.2d 1050,
1052-53 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Allen, 666 F. Supp. 847, 852 (E.D. Va.
1987), affd sub nom. United States v. Harrell, 847 F.2d 138 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
488 U.S. 944 (1988); People v. Taylor, 524 N.E.2d 1216, 1221 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988);
State v. Foote, 791 S.W.2d 879, 882 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).
In addition, prosecutors sometimes explain that they strike a juror who has an
unemployed spouse. See, e.g., People v. Harper, 279 Cal. Rptr. 204, 207 n.1 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1991); Levy v. State, 749 S.W.2d 176, 178 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988).
117. 529 So. 2d 635 (Miss. 1988).
118. Id. at 637. For another example, see United States v. McCoy, 848 F.2d 743,
745 (6th Cir. 1988).
119. See, e.g., People v. Morgan, 568 N.E.2d 755, 761 (111. 1991), rev'd on other
grounds, Morgan v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 2222 (1992); People v. Hope, 560 N.E.2d 849,
857 (Ill. 1990); People v. Harris, 544 N.E.2d 357, 380 (Il1. 1989).
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in People v. Mack, 20 the prosecutor struck a black woman
juror, asserting that her status as unemployed and divorced
raised "'some questions'" about how she supported herself.
121
Similarly, in another case, the prosecutor claimed that a
black man's unemployment raised concerns about how he
supported himself and his child. 22 In the only case in which
an unemployment explanation was rejected, the Arkansas
Supreme Court described the explanation as a "pretty thin"
reason for rebutting the defendant's prima facie case.
23
4. Religion-In only a handful of the cases we studied did
the prosecutor offer a neutral explanation based upon
religion. It was simply a matter of excusing persons with
particular or strong religious beliefs. In most cases, the court
did not attempt to determine whether other venire members
with similar religious beliefs were also excused. Nevertheless,
in every case, the court upheld the explanation. For instance,
in Johnson v. State, 24 the court permitted the dismissal of a
juror who gave "non-committal" responses to questions about
religion, even though the court made no attempt to determine
whether any of the seated jurors were similarly noncommit-
tal.'25 Moreover, prosecutors have been permitted to excuse
jurors simply because of the jurors' general religious
beliefs.'26 In addition, prosecutors also have excused jurors
for belonging to a "fringe religious group."'27
5. Demeanor-A juror's demeanor is an extremely
frequent neutral explanation in our study. It is also the most
subjective type of explanation and thus, the easiest and most
likely pretext for striking black jurors.
120. 538 N.E.2d 1107 (Ill. 1989).
121. Id. at 1112.
122. People v. Jones, 559 N.E.2d 112, 115 (Ill. 1990).
123. Ward v. State, 733 S.W.2d 728, 730 (Ark. 1987).
124. 529 So. 2d 577 (Miss. 1988).
125. Id. at 584; see also Grady v. State, 730 S.W.2d 191, 195 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987)
(allowing dismissal of a juror for, among other reasons, not listing religious prefer-
ences despite the lack of determination that other jurors had acted differently).
126. See, e.g., People v. Malone, 570 N.E.2d 584, 589-90 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)
(allowing a strike because religion played a major role in the juror's life); State v.
Worthy, 532 So. 2d 541, 553 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (allowing a strike because the juror
carried a Bible); State v. Brown, 522 So. 2d 1110, 1114 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (allowing
a strike because the juror had strong religious experiences).
127. Chambers v. State, 724 S.W.2d 440, 442 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (excluding a
Jehovah's Witness, and a member of the Church of Christ); see also State v. Young,
569 So. 2d 570, 578 (La. Ct. App. 1990) (allowing the strike of member of the
Greater New God Church).
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The veracity of many demeanor explanations are complete-
ly unverifiable by a judge. This occurs particularly when the
prosecutor says that the juror was dismissed simply because
the prosecutor did not like the juror's demeanor in general. 128
It also occurs when the prosecutor says that a juror
generated a "bad feeling,"129 that "something seemed un-
favorable, ''13O or that the juror made the prosecutor "feel
uncomfortable." 13' It is just as difficult to verify the fairly
common explanation that the juror did not make eye contact
with the prosecutor.
132
On the other hand, some demeanor explanations refer to
aspects of the juror's behavior that a trial judge could confirm
and compare to that of white jurors who were not dismissed.
For instance, some prosecutors have explained that a struck
juror's manner of dress indicated a personality defect. In
Lockett v. State,33 for example, the prosecutor successfully
dismissed a black juror purportedly because he indicated a lack
of respect for the proceedings by wearing a hat into the
courtroom.'34 In State v. Williams,13' a juror wearing sunglasses
was excused for the same reason.' 36 Prosecutors commonly
128. See, e.g., Levert v. State, 512 So. 2d 790, 795-96 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987);
People v. Murff, 574 N.E.2d 815, 819 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); People v. Talley, 504
N.E.2d 1318, 1327-28 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987); Stockton v. Commonwealth, 402 S.E.2d
196, 205-06 (Va. 1991).
129. State v. Willis, 552 So. 2d 39, 42 (La. Ct. App. 1989).
130. Rodgers v. State, 725 S.W.2d 477, 480 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987).
131. State v. Melvin, 392 S.E.2d 740, 748 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990); see also State v.
Minor, 755 S.W.2d 318, 321 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (allowing the prosecutor to strike a
juror because the juror seemed to be a "strange person"); Rice v. State, 746 S.W.2d
356, 357 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (allowing the prosecutor to strike a juror because the
prosecutor and juror did not relate well).
132. See, e.g., People v. Mack, 538 N.E.2d 1107, 1111 (Ill. 1989); State v. Guil-
lory, 544 So. 2d 643, 650 (La. Ct. App. 1989); Stanley v. State, 582 A.2d 532, 538
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1990); Wheeler v. State, 536 So. 2d 1347, 1351 (Miss. 1988);
State v. Jones, 789 S.W.2d 545, 549 (Tenn. 1990). Conversely, in one case, a prose-
cutor explained that he struck a juror because the juror did make eye contact with
him. The prosecutor stated that the venireperson "just kept glaring at me ... [j]ust
for that reason I struck him"); State v. Shanks, 809 S.W.2d 413, 415-16 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1991).
133. 517 So. 2d 1346 (Miss. 1987).
134. Id. at 1351.
135. 545 So. 2d 651 (La. Ct. App. 1989).
136. Id. at 654-55 (citing the difficulty in making eye contact); see also United
States v. Rodrequez, 859 F.2d 1321, 1324 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1058
(1989) (disrespectful chain outside juror's clothing); United States v. Biaggi, 673 F.
Supp. 96, 105 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (disrespectful t-shirt); Stephens v. State, 580 So. 2d 11,
15 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990) (disrespectful sunglasses); Stanford v. Commonwealth, 793
S.W.2d 112, 113 (Ky. 1990) (excusing a juror with a "handkerchief flowing out of his
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explain as a reason for dismissal that the juror fell asleep
during questioning; this explanation is also verifiable and can
be compared to the behavior of jurors not challenged. 3 '
A solid majority of demeanor explanations are not objec-
tively verifiable; rather, they are subjective judgments about
behavior with which another observer may or may not agree.
For instance, prosecutors have explained that they dismissed
jurors for acting "totally off the wall" during questioning,138
appearing inattentive,'139  strong-willed, headstrong or
opinionated, 4 ° seeming weak or tentative, nervous,14 and
too casual. 4 3 Explanations have been based on grimaces,1
4
sympathetic looks,145 smiles,"46 nods, 147 and blank stares.1
48
suit with a red shirt on"); Chambliss v. Commonwealth, 386 S.E.2d 478, 479 (Va. Ct.
App. 1989) (disrespectful sweatsuit); Taitano v. Commonwealth, 358 S.E.2d 590, 591
(Va. Ct. App. 1987) (excusing a juror who was "dressed as if he were going to work
at the shipyard").
137. See, e.g., People v. Jenkins, 545 N.E.2d 986, 1003 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989); State
v. Rush, 788 S.W.2d 784, 785 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990). It is more difficult to verify and
cross-check an explanation that the juror was drowsy during questioning. See, e.g.,
Seubert v. State, 749 S.W.2d 585, 586 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988), rev'd on other grounds,
787 S.W.2d 68 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
138. State v. Griffin, 563 So. 2d 334, 339 (La. Ct. App. 1990).
139. See, e.g., United States v. Allen, 666 F. Supp. 847, 851 (E.D. Va. 1987),
affd, 847 F.2d 138 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 944 (1988); People v. Daniels,
517 N.E.2d 626, 627 (Ill. 1987); State v. Jackson, 548 So. 2d 29, 33-34 (La. Ct. App.
1989); State v. Gilmore, 522 So. 2d 658, 661 (La. Ct. App. 1988). For cases where
specific examples of inattentiveness are given, see United States v. Hendrieth, 922
F.2d 748, 749 (11th Cir. 1991) (striking a juror who was "rubbing and rolling her
eyes"); United States v. Garrison, 849 F.2d 103, 105 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
996 (1988) (striking two jurors who talked during voir dire); State v. Brown, 522
So. 2d 1110, 1114 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (reading a book during voir dire).
140. See, e.g., Ex parte Williams, 571 So. 2d 987, 990 (Ala. 1990); People v.
Murff, 574 N.E.2d 815, 819 (Ill. 1991); People v. Taylor, 524 N.E.2d 1216, 1220 (Ill.
1988); State v. Sanders, 383 S.E.2d 409, 414 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989).
141. See, e.g., United States v. Ruiz, 894 F.2d 501, 506 (2d Cir. 1990); State v.
Otis, 586 So. 2d 595, 602 (La. Ct. App. 1991); State v. Griffin, 563 So. 2d 334, 339
(La. Ct. App. 1990); State v. Wiley, 513 So. 2d 849, 863 (La. Ct. App. 1987).
142. See, e.g., Chew v. State, 527 A.2d 332, 341 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1987); State
v. Smith, 400 S.E.2d 712, 727 (N.C. 1991).
143. See, e.g., United States v. Biaggi, 853 F.2d 89, 96 (2d Cir. 1988) (flippant
attitude), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1052 (1989); People v. Mack, 538 N.E.2d 1107, 1111
(Ill. 1989); People v. Jenkins, 545 N.E.2d 986, 1003 (111. App. Ct. 1989) (cavalier
attitude).
144. See, e.g., Baker v. State, 555 So. 2d 273, 274-75 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989).
145. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 545 So. 2d 651, 654 (La. Ct. App. 1989).
146. See, e.g., Stewart v. State, 748 S.W.2d 543, 545 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988);
Yarbough v. State, 732 S.W.2d 86, 90 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987).
147. See, e.g., Chambers v. State, 724 S.W.2d 440, 442 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987).
148. State v. Collier, 553 So. 2d 815, 820 (La. 1989).
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When courts reject demeanor-based explanations, they
often recognize the possibility that the explanation was in-
voked as a pretext for a race-based strike. In Avery v.
State,149 the prosecutor explained that he struck four blacks
because of their general demeanor and body language.15 °
Little or no voir dire questioning of the black jurors took
place,15 and the court noted the unlikelihood of having four
blacks who actually displayed objectionable demeanor.5 2
Accordingly, the court rejected the prosecutor's explanations,
holding that they appeared to be post-hoc rationalizations for
striking blacks from the jury.13 In another case, a court
rejected the prosecutor's dismissal of a juror for yawning and
appearing inattentive because the explanation seemed un-
reasonable and unsupported by the record.5 4 In Williams v.
State,'55 the court rejected the explanation that an excused
juror appeared "docile" because the explanation appeared
suspect upon considering the weaknesses of various other
explanations for that juror's dismissal.' Likewise, a
prosecutor's explanation that a dismissed juror "looked a
little slow" was rejected by the Georgia Supreme Court as
insufficient when juxtaposed with the weakness of other
explanations offered during the same proceeding.'57
Some courts rejected demeanor-based explanations and
stressed the need for evidence that corroborates the explanation.
State v. Payton5 rejected three demeanor-based explanations,
stating that the trial court should closely examine such
explanations. 5 9 Because the prosecution asked no questions of
the dismissed jurors, the Payton court rejected the explana-
tions. 0 In an Alabama case, the prosecutor's explanation that
149. 545 So. 2d 123 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988).
150. Id. at 126.
151. Id. at 127.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 128.
154. Hill v. State, 547 So. 2d 175, 176-77 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
155. 548 So. 2d 501 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988).
156. Id. at 505. The court considered "implausible" the prosecutor's assumption
that the juror was opposed to punishing criminals simply because she worked for a
public school, and characterized as conjectural the assumption that because she had
heard of the defendant, she knew of a previous mistrial. Id. at 506-07.
157. Gamble v. State, 357 S.E.2d 792, 796 (Ga. 1987). Other explanations
rejected by the court included Masonic membership and knowledge of persons with
alcohol problems. Id.
158. 747 S.W.2d 290 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
159. Id. at 293.
160. Id. at 293-94.
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three jurors were struck for improper demeanor was rejected
as "superficial and show[ing] a lack of proper examination." 61
The prosecutor in State v. Butler'62 claimed to have struck
two black jurors because they laughed. 16 Because no ques-
tions were asked to check the jurors' seriousness or respect
for the judicial system, the court rejected the explanations. 164
The Butler court also rejected an explanation that a juror
seemed intimidated because the prosecution did not attempt
to determine whether the juror actually was intimidated.'65
Also, in Mitchell v. State,6 6 the Arkansas Supreme Court
rejected a demeanor explanation because the trial court had
accepted it at face value without investigating its accuracy.
67
The South Carolina Supreme Court rejected a demeanor
explanation because the explanation rested upon racial
stereotypes. In State v. Tomlin,168 the prosecutor justified
dismissing a black woman because she "walked slow [and]
talked low,"6 9 and excusing a black man because he "shucked
and jived" as he walked. 170 Both, the court said, represented
racial stereotypes and thus impermissible grounds for a
neutral explanation under Batson.
171
6. Relationship with a Trial Participant-Another com-
mon neutral explanation is that the prospective juror has a
personal relationship with, or special knowledge of, a trial
participant. Such explanations invariably are accepted by
trial courts and upheld by appellate courts. The objective
rationale behind a prosecutor striking a juror for these
reasons seems clear: concern about juror bias. A closer ex-
amination of the relationship, however, may show that it is
so attenuated as to be mere pretext. Jurors are struck be-
cause of purported relationships to trial participants in a
range of situations from being a member of the defendant's
161. Madison v. State, 545 So. 2d 94, 97, 99 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987). The prosecu-
tor's voir dire of these jurors was so desultory that the prosecutor was actually
unable to say what about the jurors' demeanor troubled him. Id. at 97.
162. 731 S.W.2d 265 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
163. Id. at 270.
164. Id. at 271-72.
165. Id. at 272-72.
166. 750 S.W.2d 936 (Ark. 1988).
167. Id. at 939-40. The prosecutor had asserted that the venireperson's manner
in responding to questions indicated his dishonesty. Id.
168. 384 S.E.2d 707 (S.C. 1989).
169. Id. at 708.
170. Id. (emphasis omitted).
171. Id. at 710.
250
Explanations Under Batson v. Kentucky
family 172 to having mere potential knowledge of a par-
ticipant's identity. 173 Furthermore, prosecutorial racial bias is
the more likely factor when blacks and whites with similar
relationships to trial participants are treated differentially.
The existence of racially segregated social communities also
may contribute to the use of this explanation to exclude
blacks disproportionately in those cases where the defendant
is black.
Courts routinely accept explanations from prosecutors who
claim that they challenged a juror based upon that juror's
relationship with the defendant. In most states, prospective
jurors related to the defendant by blood or marriage may be
excused for cause. 174 If the trial judge nonetheless chooses not
to excuse the juror for cause, perhaps because the juror's
relationship to the defendant is too attenuated, 175 then the
prosecutor can exercise a peremptory challenge to exclude the
juror. In Ex parte Lynn, 76 the prosecutor successfully chal-
lenged a juror whose husband was related to the
defendant.
177
More often, however, peremptories are exercised in cases in
which the juror's relationship to the defendant lies outside
family ties. For example, in State v. Henderson,17' a
Louisiana court found that because a venireperson knew the
defendant's family, the prosecutor permissibly exercised a
peremptory challenge against her. 79 Henderson's holding is
consistent with other case law.8 ° Typically, the cases do not
172. See, e.g., Ex parte Lynn, 543 So. 2d 709, 711 (Ala. 1988) (striking a
venireperson whose husband was related to the defendant's father).
173. See, e.g., Hillman v. State, 362 S.E.2d 417, 418 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987) (striking
a venireperson on the belief that he knew the district attorney).
174. See, e.g., MICH. CT. R. § 6.412 (authorizing challenge of cause for a prospec-
tive juror who is related within the ninth degree by blood or marriage to a party or
an attorney); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 229 (West 1994) (authorizing challenge for
cause of any prospective juror who is related within the fourth degree to a party, an
alleged witness, or an alleged victim).
175. See, e.g., State v. Bland, 558 So.2d 719, 724 (La. Ct. App. 1990) (stating
that mere relationship between the juror and a party is not enough to justify a
strike); State v. Lawson, 794 S.W.2d 363, 367 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990) (retaining a
juror who was the widow of the defendant's first cousin).
176. 543 So. 2d 709 (Ala. 1988).
177. Id. at 711; see also Jackson v. State, 549 So. 2d 616, 618 (Ala. Crim. App.
1989) (excusing a juror whose husband was related to the defendant's stepfather).
178. 571 So. 2d 770 (La. Ct. App. 1990).
179. Id. at 773.
180. For other illustrative cases in which the venireperson was struck because
the juror knew the defendant, see United States v. Alston, 895 F.2d 1362, 1367
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discuss how the juror knew the defendant beyond the
declaratory statement by the prosecutor.
Prosecutors also exercise peremptory challenges upon find-
ing a social or professional connection between the defense
attorney and the prospective juror. Such social relationships
extend across a continuum, from a venireperson's close
friendship with the defense counsel' 81 to a venireperson's
knowledge of a local defense counsel who is not involved in
the case at bar.182 Even jurors who profess only indirect ac-
quaintance with the defense counsel often are struck.' 83 In
one case, the prosecutor struck a prospective juror in part
because the juror knew employees of the defense lawyer.'
Moreover, courts generally allow prosecutors to strike jurors
who have been involved either currently or previously in a
professional relationship with the defense counsel'85 or her
law firm.'86
The cases indicate that prosecutors rarely strike
venirepersons with whom they share social ties.8 7 Predictably,
(11th Cir. 1990); United States v. Iron Moccasin, 878 F.2d 226, 229 (8th Cir. 1989);
Avery v. State, 545 So. 2d 123, 126 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988); Chisolm v. State, 529
So. 2d 630, 633 (Miss. 1988); State v. Johnson, 395 S.E.2d 167, 168 (S.C. 1990).
181. See, e.g., McGahee v. State, 554 So. 2d 454, 461 (Ala. Crim. App.), affd, 554
So. 2d 473, (Ala. 1989); see also Strong v. State, 538 So. 2d 815, 816 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1988); People v. Young, 538 N.E.2d 453, 456 (Ill. 1989); State v. Melvin, 392
S.E.2d 740, 748 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990); State v. Ramos, 574 A.2d 1213, 1217 (R.I.
1990); State v. Jones, 789 S.W.2d 545, 549 (Tenn.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 908 (1990).
182. See, e.g., Durham v. State, 363 S.E.2d 607, 610-11 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987)
(striking a juror on the mistaken belief that the juror was a friend of several
defense attorneys in the area); Chisolm v. State, 529 So. 2d 630, 633 (Miss. 1988)
(excluding a juror because of the juror's connections with a local defense attorney).
183. See, e.g., State v. Butler, 795 S.W.2d 680, 687 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990).
184. State v. Brown, 522 So. 2d 1110, 1114 (La. Ct. App. 1988), cert. denied, 548
So. 2d 1222 (La. 1989).
185. See, e.g., Lewis v. State, 535 So. 2d 228, 231-32 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988)
(upholding the prosecutor's dismissal of two jurors who had been clients of the
defense counsel). For examples of strikes where the defense lawyer had represented
a relative of the juror, see Pollard v. State, 549 So. 2d 593, 595 (Ala. Crim. App.
1989) (juror's father); Ward v. State, 539 So. 2d 407, 408 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988)
(juror's son); State v. Mines, 524 So. 2d 526, 548 (La. Ct. App.) (juror's brother), cert.
denied, 531 So. 2d 267 (La. 1988); State v. Porter, 391 S.E.2d 144, 151 (N.C. 1990)
(juror's girlfriend); cf. Bedford v. State, 548 So. 2d 1097, 1098 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989)
(excusing a juror because the defense counsel's law firm had represented the juror's
relative).
186. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 939 F.2d 605, 609 (8th Cir. 1991) (striking
a juror who had professional ties with defense counsel's law firm); cf State v. Knox,
464 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 1990) (upholding the strike of a juror who knew the
defense counsel's law partners and had worked with defense counsel on an or-
ganization's board).
187. But see State v. Lawrence, 791 S.W.2d 729, 730 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (allowing
a prosecutor to strike a juror whom he thought was his wife's doctor).
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however, the prosector will exercise peremptory challenges
when he believes he has previously brought criminal charges
against a member of the juror's family'88 or when he has
represented a party that opposed the juror in an earlier civil
case.189 For example, in State v. Brown,19 ° the prosecutor
successfully struck a juror because he had represented the
juror's husband in a civil matter.'" Prosecutors also appear
concerned when jurors know the court 192 or law enforcement
personnel' 93 involved in the case.
Lastly, prosecutors strike venirepersons for having ties to
the victim of the crime'94 or for having an actual or potential
acquaintance with witnesses scheduled to testify. 95 These
188. See, e.g., Brownlee v. State, 535 So. 2d 221, 223 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988);
Johnson v. State, 512 So. 2d 819, 821 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987); State v. Brown, 507
So. 2d 304, 309 (La. Ct. App. 1987); Chisolm v. State, 529 So. 2d 630, 633 (Miss.
1988).
189. See, e.g., Baker v. State, 555 So. 2d 273, 275 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989) (involv-
ing a prosecutor who had sued the juror and his son); Pollard v. State, 549 So. 2d
593, 596 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989) (involving a prosecutor who had previously repre-
sented the city when the juror had sued the city over voting rights); State v. Moody,
587 So. 2d 183, 187 (La. Ct. App. 1991) (involving a prosecutor whose civil practice
had frequently engaged in actions against the juror's father).
190. 507 So. 2d 304 (La. Ct. App. 1987).
191. Id. at 309.
192. See, e.g., People v. Sanders, 797 P.2d 561, 575 (Cal. 1990) (involving a juror
who knew the trial judge), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2249 (1991); State v. Pruitt, 755
S.W.2d 309, 312 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (upholding the strike of a juror who knew the
deputy sheriff serving the court "to avoid the appearance of any impropriety or bias'
in the courtroom), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1093 (1990).
193. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 395 S.E.2d 167, 168 (S.C. 1990) (involving the
juror's neighbor who had been arrested by an officer involved in the case); Garza v.
State, 739 S.W.2d 374, 375 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (involving the juror's brother who
was the chief deputy sheriff who had decided not to investigate the crime for which
the defendant was charged).
194. See, e.g., State v. Baker, 528 So. 2d 776, 780 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (upholding
the strike of a juror in aggravated kidnapping case in part because the juror was
related by marriage to the victims); cf State v. Kilgore, 771 S.W.2d 57, 63 (Mo.)
(upholding the strike of a juror who had seen victim's son, a homosexual
transvestite, on television and on the street), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 874 (1989).
195. See, e.g., United States v. Hendrieth, 922 F.2d 748, 749 (11th Cir. 1991)
(sister-in-law of the defense witness); United States v. Biaggi, 705 F. Supp. 867,
869 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (employee of the defense witness); Davis v. State, 555 So. 2d
309, 314 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989) (acquaintance of the defense witness); Henderson v.
State, 360 S.E.2d 263, 266 (Ga. 1987) (same); People v. Hope, 560 N.E.2d 849, 868
(Ill. 1990) (same building as a potential witness), vacated, 111 S. Ct. 2792 (1991)
(explanations found to be pretextual), and modified, 589 N.E.2d 503, 506 (Ill. 1992);
State v. Milo, 815 P.2d 519, 525-26 (Kan. 1991) (acquaintance with the victim's
daughter or other people involved in the case); State v. Boyd, 784 S.W.2d 226, 227
(Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (acquaintance with a family "with the same surname as two of
the [defense] witnesses,"); State v. Rowe, 423 N.W.2d 782, 787 (Neb. 1988) (ac-
quaintance with a witness); Sanders v. State, 727 S.W.2d 674, 676 (Tex. Crim. App.
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circumstances raise several concerns for prosecutors. First,
the juror may have pretrial knowledge of the case. Second,
even without foreknowledge of the facts, the juror may over-
value or undervalue the testimony of witnesses, depending
upon the juror's prior relationship to them. Third, if the juror
knows a witness who is an associate of the defendant, then
the juror may be personally acquainted with the defendant.
A few courts have rejected the explanation that a juror is
familiar with the people involved with the case. In People v.
Harris,9 ' the Illinois Supreme Court rejected the explanation
that the juror maintained a friendship with a lawyer as suffi-
cient to rebut the prima facie case of discrimination. 9 7 In
State v. Oglesby,9 ' the South Carolina Supreme Court ruled
that the solicitor had applied "blatantly inconsistent stan-
dards" when he struck three black jurors on the ground that
they were patients of a doctor who was a defense witness, but
he did not excuse a white juror who was also the same doc-
tor's patient. 19s In another case, a prosector claimed that he
had struck five prospective jurors because they had indicated
that they knew the defendant.2"' An Alabama appellate court
rejected this explanation because court records indicated that
only one of them in fact knew the defendant.2"' In Gamble v.
State,2 °2 the prosecutor excluded a prospective juror because
he inferred that he previously must have prosecuted the juror
for child support because the juror had called the prosecutor
"the D.A.," even though the prosecutor did not recognize or
know the juror.20" The Georgia Supreme Court rejected this
exclusion as too tenuous. 204 As a last representative example,
the Missouri Court of Appeals rejected the state attorney's
purported concern over a black juror's potential unease in
rendering judgment against the defendant whom the juror
knew from church because the prosecutor did not exhibit
1987) (citing an acquaintance with a defense character witness).
196. 544 N.E.2d 357 (Ill. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1018 (1990).
197. Id. at 384.
198. 379 S.E.2d 891 (S.C. 1989).
199. Id. at 892.
200. Floyd v. State, 539 So. 2d 357, 364 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987).
201. Id. at 364.
202. 357 S.E.2d 792 (Ga. 1987).
203. Id. at 795.
204. Id. The prosecutor apparently argued that the juror calling him "the D.A."
indicated that the juror had previously been prosecuted by him. The prosecutor
himself admitted that the inference was very remote. Id.
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similar concern regarding a white juror who knew the
defendant from work.0 5
7. Lack of "Intelligence"--Prosecutors routinely strike
jurors because the jurors lack formal education or because
they appear inarticulate. Prosecutors apparently think that
criminal trials are so complicated that large segments of the
population, the undereducated and the uneducated, should be
barred from serving on juries. Occasionally, potential jurors
are struck because they have not attained a certain level of
formal education, such as obtaining a high school degree.0 6
More commonly, when the prosecutor has alleged that the
juror had limited educational achievement, appellate courts
have not explicitly required trial courts to ensure the ac-
curacy of the assertion.20 7 Rather, they tend to defer to trial
courts' assessment of the evidence and, consequentially, to
their ruling.
In addition, prosecutors strike jurors who appear to be of
below-average intelligence, although no formal criteria define
what constitutes an acceptable degree of intelligence. 2 8 For
205. State v. Reliford, 753 S.W.2d 9, 11 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
206. See, e.g., United States v. Lane, 866 F.2d 103, 108 (4th Cir. 1989) (uphold-
ing the dismissal of a black juror who had not completed high school because the
prosecutor wanted an educated jury, despite the prosecutor's acceptance of a white
juror who had not finished high school); United States v. Harrell, 847 F.2d 138, 139
(4th Cir.) (excusing a juror who had no secondary education), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
944 (1988); State v. Lindsey, 543 So. 2d 886, 898 (La. 1989) (excusing a juror who
had not finished eleventh grade), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1074 (1990).
207. See, e.g., People v. Staten, 746 P.2d 1362, 1366 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987) (ruling
without a discussion of the trial court's level of inquiry); State v. Young, 569 So. 2d
570, 578 (La. Ct. App. 1990) (same), cert. denied, 575 So. 2d 386 (La. 1991); State v.
Moore, 438 N.W.2d 101, 107 (Minn. 1989) (ruling without comment on the trial
court's duty to verify independently the prosecutor's reasons for dismissal, despite
defense's arguments at trial for such); Lockett v. State, 517 So. 2d 1346, 1352 (Miss.
1987) (lacking court comment on the level of the investigation), cert. denied, 487
U.S. 1210 (1988).
208. See, e.g., United States v. Biaggi, 705 F. Supp. 867, 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)
(striking a juror for the inability to understand complex RICO charges and not
speaking or understanding English well); Gaston v. State, 581 So. 2d 548, 550 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1991) (striking a juror who prosecutor believed had a mental problem
that would hinder her understanding of DNA identification testimony); Pollard v.
State, 549 So. 2d 593, 595 (Ala. Crim. App.) (excusing a juror who was unemployed,
had two prior convictions, and could not handle complex issues), cert. denied, No.
809-1224 (Ala. 1989); Brownlee v. State, 535 So. 2d 221, 223 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988)
(excusing a juror for not being smart enough to understand the accomplice theory of
criminal liability); State v. Jackson, 760 P.2d 589, 591 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988) (uphol-
ding the strike in part because of the prosecutor's explanation that "given her
responses, it was my impression that she wasn't a particularly bright juror").
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example, in Stanford v. Commonwealth,2 9 a black juror was
stricken successfully because the prosecutor perceived him as
mentally "slow." 210 Prosecutors also exercise peremptory
strikes when the interrogating attorney and the prospective
juror miscommunicate, whether the misunderstanding was
real or apparent. These miscommunications involve jurors
experiencing difficulty in answering questions or mis-
comprehending either the voir dire or the trial process. Such
a miscomprehension occurred in United States v. Sherrills,21 1
in which, during voir dire, an inattentive juror misunderstood
the term "foreperson" and inaccurately answered that she
had served as one on a prior jury. 12 In State v. Lindsey,213 a
juror was struck because she had difficulty articulating her
response to a multiple-part question regarding her back-
ground.214 Further, prosecutors do not necessarily wait for
verbal blunders before striking jurors; some facial ex-
pressions also precipitate strikes. 215 Alternatively, if the
prosecutor does not immediately understand the juror's
response, because the juror had an accent or the juror's
meaning was unclear, then the prosecutor may strike the
juror without seeking further elaboration.216
8. Socioeconomic Status-Consistent with efforts to keep
lesser-educated people off juries, prosecutors use peremptory
challenges to keep low-income people off the jury.217
209. 793 S.W.2d 112 (Ky. 1990).
210. Id. at 114.
211. 929 F.2d 393 (8th Cir. 1991).
212. Id. at 394. The court explained that it had allowed challenges based on
jurors' inattentiveness, but that it did so only with a fully developed record. Id. at
395.
213. 543 So. 2d 886 (La. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1074 (1990).
214. Id. at 898. The juror's "giddy" manner also bothered the prosecutor. Id.; see
also United States v. Hoelscher, 914 F.2d 1527, 1541 (8th Cir. 1990) (involving a
juror who did not know if the previous case for which she was a juror had been civil
or criminal); People v. Mack, 538 N.E.2d 1107, 1111 (Ill. 1989) (involving a juror
who did not seem to understand questions she was asked), cert. denied, 549 U.S.
1093 (1990); State v. Carter, 522 So. 2d 1100, 1105 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (involving a
juror who did not seem to understand the proceedings).
215. See, e.g., State v. Guillory, 544 So. 2d 643, 650 (La. Ct. App.) (involving
facial expression that indicated that the juror did not understand voir dire ques-
tions), cert. denied, 551 So. 2d 1334 (La. 1989).
216. See, e.g., United States v. Ruiz, 894 F.2d 501, 506-07 (2d Cir. 1990); People
v. Staten, 746 P.2d 1362, 1366 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987); State v. Gonzalez, 538 A.2d
210, 215-16 (Conn. 1988); State v. Boyd, 784 S.W.2d 226, 227 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
217. See, e.g., United States v. Hughes, 911 F.2d 113, 114 (8th Cir. 1990) (juror
of low economic status); State v. Andrews, 770 S.W.2d 424, 425 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989)
(poor and unemployed juror); cf. Killens v. State, 362 S.E.2d 425, 427 (Ga. Ct. App.
1987) (social security disability recipient).
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Prosecutors also strike middle-class workers from juries,
based upon their socioeconomic status. For example, in
Shelton v. State,218 the prosecutor struck three blue-collar
workers from the jury because she felt that an earlier
mistrial had resulted from the victim's appearing arrogant to
blue-collar workers on the first jury.2 19
9. Residence-In the numerous cases in which the place of
the juror's residence is used as the neutral explanation for the
prosecutor's strike, the vast majority of such explanations were
accepted by trial courts and affirmed by courts of appeal. These
geographically based challenges, even if not obviously race-
based, at least raise the specter of discrimination, given that
racial segregation in housing persists throughout the United
States.22 °
When a venireperson is struck because the juror resides in
the "neighborhood" of the defendant or a witness, "neighbor-
hood" seemingly can be defined as broadly as necessary to
support the strike. The size of the defendant's neighborhood
ranges from a one-block radius from her home221 to her entire
town.222 It is unclear whether courts consider the actual size
of the municipality. In most cases, the lack of a defined
"neighborhood," results in courts endorsing the bare assertion
of proximity.2 23 Prosecutors also exercise challenges when a
218. 521 So. 2d 1035 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987), cert. denied, 521 So. 2d 1038 (Ala.
1988).
219. Id. at 1037; see also People v. Barber, 245 Cal. Rptr. 895, 900 (Cal. Ct. App.
1988) (striking a juror who wore a Coors jacket and worked on an assembly line).
220. See, e.g., Alex S. Nevarro, Note, Bona Fide Damages for Tester Plaintiffs: An
Economic Approach to Private Enforcement of the Antidiscrimination Statute, 81 GEO.
L.J. 2727, 2727, 2744 (1993). For a discussion and statistical compilation of racial
segregation in housing, see A COMMON DESTINY: BLACKS AND AMERICAN SOCIETY
(Gerald D. Jaynes & Robin M. Williams, Jr. eds., 1989).
221. See, e.g., Ex parte Lynn, 543 So. 2d 709 (Ala. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
945 (1989).
222. See, e.g., United States v. Angiulo, 847 F.2d 956, 985 (1st Cir.) (finding
neutral the explanation that the juror was from the same small town as a number
of the defendants), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 852 (1988).
223. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 936 F.2d 1243, 1247 (11th Cir.) (strik-
ing a juror because she lived in the same geographical area as persons convicted by
same prosecutor in an earlier case), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 612 (1991); Ex parte
Lynn, 543 So. 2d 709, 711 (Ala. 1988) (allowing the exclusion of jurors who lived in
the same neighborhood as the defendant's relatives), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 945
(1989); People v. Davis, 234 Cal. Rptr. 859, 869 (Cal. App. Ct. 1987) (striking a juror
because she was from a suburb adjacent to the one where the crime had occurred);
People v. Jones, 559 N.E.2d 112, 115 (Il. App. Ct.) (allowing a strike where the
juror lived in the defendant's neighborhood), appeal denied, 561 N.E.2d 700 (Ill.
1990), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1593 (1992); Johnson v. State, 529 So. 2d 577, 583
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relative of the juror lives in the defendant's neighborhood 224
or when a relative of the defendant lives in the same neigh-
borhood as the juror.225 Attending the same high school as
the defendant supports a challenge as well.226 One juror was
struck in part because of some "familiarity" with the
defendant's area of residence, although the prosecutor did not
explain the extent of that familiarity.
27
Prosecutors also strike jurors who live or work near the
crime scene. 22 8 The court in People v. Baisten2 9 noted that
residence in the location where the crime was committed
might cause the juror to overhear relevant information out-
side the courtroom and thus lose objectivity.3 ° In People v.
Harper,23' the juror worked at the post office near the loca-
tion of the defendant's alibi.232 Although the juror indicated
that she had never seen a drug deal, the court accepted the
prosecutor's questioning of the juror's probity and con-
sequently accepted the strike.33
10. Marital Status-Our sample uncovered numerous
instances in which courts accepted explanations from
prosecutors who said that they struck a juror because the
juror was single. One case upholding the deliberate strike of
unmarried black jurors is Thomas v. State,234 in which a
(Miss. 1988) (accepting the prosecutor's explanation that the juror was from the
same county as the defendant and his family).
If the defendant is a political figure, venirepersons are often struck if they are
constituents of the defendant; the cases rarely mention whether the jurors even
voted for the defendant. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 877 F.2d 294, 303 (4th
Cir. 1989); United States v. Biaggi, 705 F. Supp. 867, 870 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
224. See, e.g., State v. Guillory, 544 So. 2d 643, 650 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied,
551 So. 2d 1334 (La. 1989); State v. Threet, 407 N.W.2d 766, 771 (Neb. 1987).
225. See, e.g., Ex parte Lynn, 543 So. 2d 709, 711 (Ala. 1988), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 945 (1989).
226. United States v. Peete, 919 F.2d 1168, 1179 (6th Cir. 1990).
227. Watkins v. State, 551 So. 2d 421, 422 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988), cert. denied,
No. 87-1440 (Ala. 1988), and cert. denied, No. 88-1413 (Ala. 1989).
228. See, e.g., Brownlee v. State, 535 So. 2d 221, 223 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988)
(striking a juror who lived in the general area of the crime); State v. Wylie, 525
A.2d 528, 534 (Conn. App. Ct.) (striking a juror who had knowledge of the general
area and the store where the crime occurred because he stopped there "perhaps
twice" to purchase coffee), cert. denied, 528 A.2d 1154 (Conn. 1987); Garza v. State,
739 S.W.2d 374, 375 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (striking a juror who frequented the bar
that was the crime scene).
229. 560 N.E.2d 1060 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 564 N.E.2d 840 (Ill. 1990).
230. Id. at 1071.
231. 279 Cal. Rptr. 204 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
232. Id. at 207.
233. Id.
234. 555 So. 2d 320 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989).
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black male defendant was charged with murdering his
girlfriend.235 The Court accepted strikes based upon unmar-
ried status, reasoning that a "single male might be sym-
pathetic" to the defendant under the facts of the case.236
Not surprisingly, prosecutors often combine the explanation
of dismissing unmarried jurors with another rationale, such
as the juror's age or employment status. For example, in
People v. Taylor,2 37 the prosecutor struck a black prospective
juror because he was young, single, and unemployed.23' The
appellate court noted that although whites selected for the
panel shared two of the three characteristics, none had all
three.239 The court added that the prosecutors may have
thought that a young, single, unemployed person was imma-
ture and would relate well to the young defendant who faced
drug charges. 240 In two instances, courts have upheld strikes
when prosecutors argued that single, unemployed persons
lacked ties to the community and thus could not serve effec-
tively as jurors.241 Prosecutors also frequently strike single
12mothers, purportedly because they would be unable to
focus on the trial given their parental responsibilities 24 3 or, in
one case, because the juror lacked the "moral fiber" to
evaluate a criminal case.244 Finally, prosecutors may exercise
235. Id. at 321.
236. Id. at 322. The prosecutor also struck single jurors who were not black. Id.;
for other such cases, see Bedford v. State, 548 So. 2d 1097, 1098 (Ala. Crim. App.
1989); Mathews v. State, 534 So. 2d 1129, 1130 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988).
237. 524'N.E.2d 1216 (Il. App. Ct. 1988).
238. Id. at 1221.
239. Id.
240. Id. For other cases in which courts upheld strikes because a juror was
young, unemployed, and single, see United States v. Jackson, 914 F.2d 1050, 1052
(8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Ross, 872 F.2d 249, 250 (8th Cir. 1989); Stephens
v. State, 580 So. 2d 11, 19 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990), affd, 580 So. 2d 26 (Ala. 1991);
Minnifield v. State, 530 So. 2d 245, 249 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987); Funches v. State,
518 So. 2d 781, 783 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987); People v. Daniels, 517 N.E.2d 626, 627
(Ill. App. Ct. 1987), appeal denied, 522 N.E.2d 1249 (Ill. 1988).
241. See, e.g., People v. Harris, 544 N.E.2d 357, 380 (I1. 1989), cert. denied, 494
U.S. 1018 (1990).
242. See, e.g., United States v. Nichols, 937 F.2d 1257, 1263 (7th Cir. 1991)
(white and black single mothers), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 989 (1992); United States
v. Williams, 934 F.2d 847, 849 (7th Cir. 1991); State v. Bell, 759 S.W.2d 651, 652
(Tenn. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1091 (1989).
243. United States v. Williams, 934 F.2d 847, 849 (7th Cir. 1991).
244. People v. Thomas, 559 N.E.2d 262, 266 (Il1. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 564
N.E.2d 846 (Ill. 1990), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 89 (1991). The court allowed the strike,
despite its misgivings about the prosecution's prejudice against unwed mothers. Id.
See also Wheeler v. State, 536 So. 2d 1347, 1351 (Miss. 1988) (striking ajuror because
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peremptory challenges against single women due to fear they
may be attracted to a male defendant.245
Prosecutors generally do not relate the marital status of
the juror directly to an element of the case, although they do
occasionally connect alternative reasons given for the strike
with the case at hand. For example, in State v. Richburg,246
in which the defendant was charged with possession of crack
cocaine, the prosecutor struck a single college student on the
presumption that college students are more tolerant toward
drugs.24 v Similarly, in another drug case, a federal prosecutor
who struck a thirty-three-year-old single female reasoned
that jurors who are single and young are more likely to have
liberal attitudes toward drugs.248 In Mathews v. State,249 the
defendant was charged with unlawful possession of phenobar-
bital.25 ° A possible defense to this charge was that the
defendant received the drugs from a friend to relieve his
pain.2 1' The State's attorney successfully challenged two
single black jurors whose friends had given them drugs to
relieve ailments after stating that young, single jurors tend
to be too sympathetic to defendants in general and drug
defendants in particular.252
In extremely rare instances, courts rejected explanations
premised in part on the juror's being unmarried.253 In People
v. McDonald,254 the Illinois Supreme Court rejected the ex-
planation that young, single males are the "worst jurors for a
rape case"255 because the prosecutor had challenged a thirty-
four-year-old single black male but accepted an eighteen-
an unwed mother of two would not be "conservative" enough for the state).
245. State v. Pratt, 452 N.W.2d 54, 58 (Neb. 1990); see also Yarbough v. State,
732 S.W.2d 86, 90 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (allowing the strike of a young, single
juror because she smiled at the defendants), vacated on other grounds, 761 S.W.2d
18 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (en banc).
246. 403 S.E.2d 315 (S.C. 1991).
247. Id. at 317.
248. United States v. Prine, 909 F.2d 1109, 1113 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 1318, and cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2263 (1991).
249. 534 So. 2d 1129 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988).
250. Id. at 1129.
251. Id. at 1130.
252. Id.
253. See, e.g., Powell v. State, 548 So. 2d 590, 592-94 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988),
cert. denied No. 88-435, (Ala. 1989); Owens v. State, 531 So. 2d 22, 24-26 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1987).
254. 530 N.E.2d 1351 (Ill. 1988).
255. Id. at 1358.
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year-old white male.256 In Marks v. State,25 7 an Alabama
appellate court approved the trial court's finding that it was
unreasonable for the prosecutor to strike a potential juror
solely because she was single and unemployed.25 s
11. Previous Involvement with the Criminal Justice
System-The most common explanation proffered by
prosecutors for exercising a challenge to a black venireperson
is that the individual has been involved with the criminal
justice system.259 For instance, in State v. Oglesby,260 the
prosecutor successfully struck a juror who had a conviction
for driving under the influence of alcohol.26' In another case,
a juror who once had been convicted but still claimed in-
nocence was struck because he exhibited "lack of respect for
the criminal justice system."26 2 In these cases courts take a
broad view of an individual's criminal record. They uphold
strikes both where the jurors themselves have been involved
with the system and where some involvement by a family
member or friend can be imputed to jurors who themselves
have otherwise "clean" records.263
Prosecutors also strike those who were arrested, tried, and
acquitted because they may refuse to consider certain
evidence and may display bias toward defendants.264 For
example, in a federal trial for conspiracy, the court upheld a
challenge to a juror who had been acquitted because the
evidence against him was "too circumstantial."2 6 The court
accepted as race-neutral explanations that the juror would
empathize with the defendant in the case at bar and might
256. Id.
257. 581 So. 2d 1182 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990), cert. denied, No. 1901196, 1991 Ala.
LEXIS 745 (Ala. 1991).
258. Id. at 1187.
259. See, e.g., Werts v. State, 395 S.E.2d 922, 924 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990) (guilty
plea to writing bad checks); People v. Talley, 504 N.E.2d 1318, 1327-28 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1987) (theft conviction); State v. Carter, 522 So. 2d 1100, 1105 (La. Ct. App.
1988) (same); Spencer v. Commonwealth, 384 S.E.2d 785, 795 (Va. 1989) (criminal
record), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1093 (1990).
260. 379 S.E.2d 891 (S.C. 1989).
261. Id. at 891.
262. State v. Johnson, 561 So. 2d 922, 926 (La. Ct. App. 1990).
263. See, e.g., Baker v. State, 555 So. 2d 273, 274-76 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989)
(allowing the strike of twelve venirepersons because they had personal or family
trouble with the law).
264. See, e.g., State v. McMillian, 779 S.W.2d 670, 673 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989)
(involving a juror found innocent in a murder trial).
265. United States v. Briscoe, 896 F.2d 1476, 1488 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 498
U.S. 863 (1990).
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not consider the circumstantial evidence that constituted
much of the government's case.2 6
In dismissing black jurors who were accused of a crime but
were not necessarily26 7 tried, prosecutors claim that such
individuals may have concerns about the fairness and impar-
tiality of the criminal justice system. In one case, an Illinois
district attorney struck the only black venireperson because
the juror, among other reasons, previously had been arrested
by the police force involved in the case at bar and felt that
they had treated him rudely.268 Prosecutors also strike blacks
when the attorneys are under the impression-but are not
certain-that the juror had some previous problems with the
police, regardless of the degree of that supposed involvement.
Consequently, the bare assertion that a juror "had been in
trouble with the law here" sufficed to strike her from a
* 269jury.
A black venireperson, however, need not have been ar-
rested or even suspected of a past crime to lead to a
prosecutor's successfully exempting the juror from the petit
jury. Courts routinely uphold strikes based upon the actual
or suspected criminal activities of the juror's family
266. Id.
267. We say "not necessarily" because the cases do not always disclose whether
the venireperson was actually tried.
268. People v. Woods, 540 N.E.2d 1020, 1021-23 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989); see also
United States v. Ferguson, 935 F.2d 862, 864-65 (7th Cir. 1991) ("Prior encounters
with the criminal justice system which might cause a juror to be hostile toward the
government have been upheld as racially neutral explanations."), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 907 (1992); People v. Jenkins, 545 N.E.2d 986, 1003 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989)
(involving a juror who was falsely accused of crime), appeal denied, 550 N.E.2d 562
(Ill. 1990); State v. Thompson, 516 So. 2d 349, 359 (La. 1987), (involving two jurors
with prior arrests), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 871 (1988); State v. Howard, 789 S.W.2d
191, 192 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (striking a juror once caught in stolen car); State v.
Rush, 788 S.W.2d 784, 785 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (striking a juror who was arrested
for felony, but not prosecuted because falsely accused).
269. Baker v. State, 555 So. 2d 273, 275 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989); see also United
States v. Alston, 895 F.2d 1362, 1367 (11th Cir. 1990) (striking a juror who had "a
reputation with the [police] for involvement in the drug trade"); Leonard v. State,
551 So. 2d 1143, 1150 (Ala. Crim. App.) (accepting the explanation that the juror
had been charged with "manslaughter and traffic violations, including one DUI")
(dictum), cert. denied, No. 88-1548 (Ala. 1989); State v. Price, 763 S.W.2d 286, 288,
290 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (involving many persons with the same surname had been
prosecuted in the past, although the prosecutor did not know whether there was, in
fact, any relation).
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members.27 For instance, in United States v. Biaggi,271 former
Congressperson Mario Biaggi was charged with violations of
the federal racketeering laws.272 At trial, Biaggi argued that
the prosecutor deliberately struck Italian-Americans and
Puerto Ricans from the jury because of their ethnicity.273 The
district judge inquired into and accepted the prosecutor's
explanations. In particular, the court held that one juror was
reasonably struck because she felt bitter against the govern-
ment for its having prosecuted her husband in the 1950s for
making false statements to Congress during an investigation
of alleged communists.274
In a few cases, courts upheld strikes when the black jurors
themselves were victims of crime, or were related to victims
of crime. 275  An Illinois capital murder case, however,
demonstrates how this explanation can be misused.2 7 ' There,
the state had claimed that it challenged a juror primarily
because she was a victim of an unsolved felony, an experience
that might have affected her impartiality.277 The Illinois
270. See, e.g., United States v. Hoelscher, 914 F.2d 1527, 1538 (8th Cir. 1990)
(striking a juror whose niece had drug problems); People v. Chambie, 234 Cal. Rptr.
308, 312 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (involving a juror whose son and brother were convict-
ed of narcotics violations); People v. Young, 538 N.E.2d 453, 457, 459 (Ill. 1989)
(excusing a juror whose ex-husband was arrested for violent crimes and convicted of
armed robbery); Yarbough v. State, 732 S.W.2d 86, 90-91 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987)
(striking a juror whose sister had been arrested).
For cases in which there was no independent inquiry into whether a relative had
been involved in criminal activities, see United States v. David, 844 F.2d 767,
768-69 (11th Cir. 1988) (involving a juror with a son on probation); Benson v. State,
551 So. 2d 188, 192 (Miss. 1989) (allowing the explanation that the prosecutor
believed the juror was either the mother or aunt of someone prosecuted three years
earlier); State v. Johnson, 395 S.E.2d 167, 168 (S.C. 1990) (striking a juror with
same last name as man who had a criminal indictment against him).
271. 705 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
272. Id. at 869.
273. Id. at 868.
274. Id. at 870; see also State v. Henderson, 750 S.W.2d 555, 558 (Mo. Ct. App.
1988) (holding that it was not racial discrimination for the prosecutor to strike a
black female who might be resentful toward police because her uncle had been
charged but acquitted of rape, despite evidence that white jurors who had convicted
relatives were not challenged).
275. See, e.g., United States v. Briscoe, 896 F.2d 1476, 1489 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 863 (1990); United States v. Dennis, 804 F.2d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1037 (1987) ; People v. Batchelor, 559 N.E.2d 948, 954
(Ill. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 564 N.E.2d 840 (Ill. 1990); Stanford v. Commonwealth,
793 S.W.2d 112, 113 (Ky. 1990); Stanley v. State, 582 A.2d 532, 535 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1990), cert. denied, 587 A.2d 247 (Md. 1991).
276. People v. Hope, 560 N.E.2d 849 (Ill. 1990), vacated and remanded, 111 S.
Ct. 2792 (1991), and vacated on reh'g, 589 N.E.2d 503 (Ill. 1992).
277. Id. at 856-57.
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Supreme Court at first found this explanation racially
neutral, given that whites were struck for similar reasons.278
On remand from the United States Supreme Court, however,
the court found this explanation pretextual given that some
white victims of crime had been admitted to the jury.279
Although a juror's prior criminal history often is unrelated
to the criminal offense charged, prosecutors occasionally base
their strikes upon a particular link between the charged
offense and the past criminal background of the juror or a
person related to the juror. Two representative cases are
People v. Parker 0 and Stephens v. State.281 In Parker, an
armed robbery case, the only black juror had a brother-in-law
with a past conviction for robbery.8 2 The prosecutor struck
the juror because the crimes were similar.283 In Stephens,
another armed robbery case, the juror himself had been ar-
rested for armed robbery.284
A handful of courts rejected explanations stemming from
the alleged criminal involvement of a juror, generally either
because the prosecutor failed to challenge white jurors with
similar criminal involvement or because the prosecutor failed
to substantiate her speculations concerning the black juror's
impartiality.2 85 In the capital murder case of Powell v.
State,8 6 the court rejected prosecution challenges to blacks
who had minor traffic offenses because whites who served on
the jury had similar driving records.28 7 In State v. Marrs,28 8
the prosecution struck the only black on the venire, because
the prosecutor saw his surname on a bench warrant and did
278. Id. at 866-67.
279. Hope, 589 N.E.2d at 506 (case on remand).
280. 519 N.E.2d 703 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 530 N.E.2d 258 (Ill. 1988).
281. 559 So. 2d 687 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
282. Parker, 519 N.E.2d at 706.
283. Id.
284. Stephens, 559 So. 2d at 689. The prosecutor, however, did not know
whether the juror had been convicted for that offense. Id.
285. See, e.g., Maloney v. Washington, 690 F. Supp. 687, 691 (N.D. 111. 1988);
Avery v. State, 545 So. 2d 123, 126-27 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988); Ex parte Branch, 526
So. 2d 609, 613-14, 625-26 & 626 n.13 (Ala. 1987); Floyd v. State, 539 So. 2d 357,
358, 362-63 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987); People v. Pagel, 232 Cal. Rptr. 104, 105 (Cal.
App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1028 (1987); State v. Price, 763
S.W.2d 286, 288 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988); State v. Herron, 745 S.W.2d 835, 837 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1988); State v. Butler, 731 S.W.2d 265, 271 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
286. 548 So. 2d 590 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988), affd, 548 So. 2d 605 (Ala. 1989).
287. Id. at 593. Other reason were also given.
288. 379 S.E.2d 497 (W. Va. 1989).
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not want a relative of someone arrested to serve.289 The West
Virginia Supreme Court deemed this explanation to be
pretextual, because the State's attorney did not ask the juror
whether he was aware if a criminal warrant was pending for
any of his relatives.290
12. Jury Experience-While courts have accepted prosecu-
tor explanations that venirepersons were struck because of
prior jury experience,29' few such explanations appeared in
our study. Paradoxically, courts also have upheld explana-
tions that venirepersons were struck due to a lack of prior
* 292jury experience.
Prosecutors who claim to be concerned with the prior
service of a venireperson usually perceive it as a liability to
the individual's present jury service. For example, in People
v. Jones,2 9 ' the court upheld a peremptory challenge because
the venireperson previously had served on a civil jury and
might confuse the burdens of proof.294 Prosecutors also ex-
clude jurors who voted "not guilty" in earlier cases, most
likely on a suspicion that such jurors are likely to do so
again. 29' For instance, in State v. Brown, 29 a juror was struck
because she had recently cast the sole "not guilty" vote in a
criminal trial.297 Prosecutors also strike jurors who have sat
289. Id. at 498.
290. Id. at 499.
291. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 531 So. 2d 1245, 1248 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987);
People v. Batchelor, 559 N.E.2d 948, 954 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 564 N.E.2d
840 (Ill. 1990); State v. Carter, 522 So. 2d 1100, 1105 (La. Ct. App. 1988); State v.
Rogers, 753 S.W.2d 607, 610 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988); State v. Davis, 386 S.E.2d 418,
424 (N.C. 1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 905 (1990).
292. See, e.g., People v. Buckley, 522 N.E.2d 86, 92 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987); People v.
Howard, 533 N.Y.S.2d 404, 406 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988), appeal denied, 535 N.E.2d
1345 (N.Y. 1989); Chambers v. State, 724 S.W.2d 440, 442 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987).
293. 541 N.E.2d 161 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989); appeal denied, 548 N.E.2d 1074 (Ill.
1990).
294. Id. at 163.
295. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 914 F.2d 139, 142 (8th Cir. 1990); People
v. Chambie, 234 Cal. Rptr. 308, 311 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (involving a juror who had
served on an acquitting jury and found serving as a juror difficult); State v. Brown,
522 So. 2d 1110, 1114-15 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (striking a juror who had cast the only
not guilty vote of 12 jurors in a prior case); Garza v. State, 739 S.W.2d 374, 375
(Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (upholding the strike of a juror who had "a tendency to not
enforce the law"); cf Minnifield v. State, 530 So. 2d 245, 248-49 (Ala. Crim. App.
1987) (challenging a juror who had sat on a jury that convicted the defendant on a
lesser included offense in murder case).
296. 522 So. 2d 1110 (La. Ct. App. 1988).
297. Id. at 1114.
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on juries that resulted in hung juries or mistrials.298 Courts
rarely rejected explanations based upon prior jury service.299
IV. IMPROVING THE TREATMENT OF EXPLANATIONS
The analysis in Part III shows that Batson's neutral ex-
planation requirement is, regrettably, a relatively simple
hurdle for a prosecutor to clear. Even a prosecutor who has
dismissed jurors for racial reasons can concoct a neutral
explanation for his actions that the courts will accept as proof
that his strikes were not racially motivated. °° Moreover, in
those cases in which race was but one of a combination of
reasons supporting a peremptory strike, the prosecutor's
opportunity to proffer nonracial reasons is unlimited, thereby
denying a remedy for the racially motivated element.30 '
The question, then, is how judicial treatment of explanations
can be improved. How can the courts refrain from accepting
rationalizations for race-based strikes without unfairly restrict-
ing the prosecutor's discretion to strike jurors for nonracial
reasons? Like all areas of discrimination law, no ideal resolu-
tion exists, for the trial judge cannot read the prosecutor's
mind to ascertain without doubt whether an explanation is
truthful or merely a sham. Any reasonable judicial test that
298. A federal prosecutor called one venireperson who had served on two hung
juries "a professional hung juror." United States v. Ruiz, 894 F.2d 501, 506 (2d Cir.
1990); see also Allen v. State, 555 So. 2d 1185, 1187 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989) (striking
nine venirepersons who had served on hung jury the previous day); Davis v. State,
551 So. 2d 165, 171 (Miss. 1989) (excusing a juror who had sat on a jury for a trial
resulting in mistrial), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1074 (1990); Levy v. State, 749 S.W.2d
176, 178 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (striking a juror who had served on criminal jury that
did not reach a verdict).
299. One court did reject a jury-service explanation. People v. Kindelan, 572
N.E.2d 1138 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 580 N.E.2d 126 (Ill. 1991). The Kindelan
court held that the State had not rebutted the prima facie case of discrimination by
explaining its peremptory challenges against three black jurors on the ground that
each previously had been called and not selected for jury service because four seated
white jurors also had been called previously and not selected. Id. at 1144-45.
300. Justice Marshall anticipated this problem. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476
U.S. 79, 106 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring).
301. The Equal Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor from dismissing a juror
even in part because of the juror's race. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 97 ("[T]he
prosecutor may not rebut the defendant's prima facie case of discrimination by
stating merely that he challenged jurors of the defendant's race on the assump-
tion-or his intuitive judgment-that they would be partial to the defendant
because of their shared race.").
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still retains peremptory challenges will allow some race-
based strikes that appear legitimate and will reject some
legitimate strikes that appear highly suspicious.
We believe that our empirical analysis shows that the
courts now lean far too heavily towards accepting
prosecutors' rationalizations for their peremptory challenges
and demanding few limitations on prosecutors' discretion to
use strikes, notwithstanding Batson's inference of discrimina-
tion. The current approach vitiates the very goal of Batson:
stopping race-based peremptories. Given the small likelihood
of success in challenging peremptories under Batson, a corre-
sponding cost is the waste of judicial time and litigation
resources.
The touchstone for improving Batson's neutral explanation
requirement is to recall that, at the time the neutral explana-
tion is offered, an "inference of purposeful discrimination"
has been established against the prosecutor. °2 This inference
justifies not only the burden of producing any explanation
that is facially neutral, but also the burden of providing a
clear and specific explanation that reasonably rebuts the
inference that has been established.30 3
If any facially neutral explanation can rebut the inference,
the folly of Batson is clear. To take an extreme example,
which one hopes lies beyond the bounds of what any court
would tolerate as a "reasonable" rebuttal, a prosecutor might
explain her strike by simply using the juror's name as a
basis. "I struck him because his name is X" is facially
neutral; however, it obviously is neither unique nor ex-
planatory. If accepted, such an "explanation" could excuse
even a strike actually based upon race. Clearly then, courts
must demand more than facial neutrality.
V. A NEW APPROACH
Because Batson as it currently stands is so easily manipu-
lated, we suggest that the following four methods be used to
302. Id. at 96.
303. See Slappy v. State, 503 So. 2d 350, 355 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
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tighten judicial scrutiny of supposedly neutral explana-
tions.30 4 The trial court must:
(A) independently confirm the basis of the explanation;
(B) affirmatively find that any other jurors with similar
characteristics to the challenged juror were struck;
(C) determine that an explanation based on characteriza-
tions of a group which includes a juror be shown
specifically true of the challenged juror; and
(D) find that an explanation is rational, meaningful, and
related to the particular case.
A. Confirmability
The reason for rejecting explanations that cannot be fac-
tually confirmed is simple: otherwise, prosecutors could al-
ways explain away race-based strikes.3 0 5 For instance, if a
prosecutor says that a juror gave her a "bad feeling,"30 6 or
that a juror makes her feel "uncomfortable,"30 7 it is impos-
sible for a judge- whether questioning the prosecutor at
trial or reading the record on appeal-to confirm that the
prosecutor actually excused the juror for the reason given.
Such excuses could be used in nearly any situation by a
prosecutor acting in bad faith. Even if genuine, they are a
dubious means of rebutting the inference of discrimination,
for, as Justice Marshall explained, prosecutors' so-called
instincts may reflect nothing more than stereotypes based
304. Other writers, to varying degrees, have advocated heightened judicial
scrutiny of neutral explanations. See, e.g., Paul H. Schwartz, Equal Protection in
Jury Selection? The Implementation of Batson v. Kentucky in North Carolina, 69
N.C. L. REV. 1533, 1564-66 (1991); David D. Hopper, Note, Batson v. Kentucky and
the Prosecutorial Peremptory Challenge: Arbitrary and Capricious Equal Protection?,
74 VA. L. REV. 811, 826-31 (1988); Joshua E. Swift, Note, Batson's Invidious
Legacy: Discriminatory Juror Exclusion and the "Intuitive" Peremptory Challenge,
78 CORNELL L. REV. 336, 361-66 (1993).
305. Swift, supra note 304, at 361-63, argues for the complete rejection of what
he terms "soft-data" explanations, i.e., those which cannot be confirmed by the
record. His central argument is that courts should accept only "hard-data" explana-
tions, i.e., those which can be confirmed by the record and that have a "substantial
nexus" to the facts of the case at bar. Id. at 338. Schwartz, supra note 304, at 1566,
urges that "vague and highly subjective' explanations should be rejected if unsup-
ported by evidence in the record.
306. State v. Willis, 552 So. 2d 39, 42 (La. Ct. App. 1989).
307. State v. Melvin, 392 S.E.2d 740, 748 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990).
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upon nationality and race.30 8 Furthermore, allowing racial
stereotypes to enter jury selection undermines the integrity
of the judicial process.0 9
Most of the unconfirmable explanations fall under the
"demeanor" category in our taxonomy.1 0 Such unverifiable,
subjective judgments should be rejected unless the trial judge
affirmatively confirms that the juror's behavior was markedly
different from that of the other jurors. Thus, for example, an
appellate court should accept the prosecutor's explanation
that he struck a juror because that juror fell asleep during
voir dire only if the juror's dozing off was confirmed on the
record by the trial court.31' On the other hand, an appellate
court should reject the prosecution's explanation that a juror
appeared too "casual, " 312 if no evidence in the record supports
that characterization. Holding otherwise would enable a
prosecutor to employ that reason as a pretext for a race-
based strike. As a Virginia appellate court stated, "[riubber
stamp approval of all nonracial explanations" that "are only
facially legitimate," makes the Batson inquiry "amount to
little more than a charade."3 13 These demeanor-based ex-
planations constitute probably the easiest method of abusing
Batson-and the easiest to stop.
B. Consistency
Courts all too often evaluate the contested explanation
without considering the rest of the voir dire by looking only
308. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring).
Thus, for example, a prosecutor who thinks that blacks are inherently untrustwor-
thy may especially notice a black person not making eye contact and thus strike the
juror, whereas a prosecutor may never notice, let alone dismiss, a white juror acting
similarly.
309. See, e.g., Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 639 (1991) ("[Ilf
race stereotypes are the price for acceptance of a jury panel as fair, the price is too
high to meet the standard of the Constitution."); Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364,
1371 (1991) ("[Rlacial discrimination in the selection of jurors 'casts doubt on the
integrity of the judicial process' and places the fairness of a criminal proceeding in
doubt."); Batson, 476 U.S. at 87 ("Selection procedures that purposefully exclude
black persons from juries undermine public confidence in the fairness of our system
of justice.").
310. See supra Part III.B.5; see also Hopper, supra note 304, at 828-29 (arguing
for heightened scrutiny of the sort of explanations this Article refers to as demean-
or-based).
311. See People v. Jenkins, 545 N.E.2d 986, 1003 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989).
312. See cases cited supra note 143.
313. Jackson v. Commonwealth, 380 S.E.2d 1, 6 (Va. Ct. App. 1989).
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at whether the prosecutor's explanation itself was neutral.
However, the court should determine whether the prosecutor
dismissed other venirepersons with traits similar to the those
objected to by the prosecutor. For instance, if the prosecutor
claims to have struck a black juror because the juror listed a
religious affiliation on her juror information form, the trial
judge should determine and note for the record, whether
other jurors who listed a religious affiliation also were
struck. This approach both can be a powerful tool for
determining whether an explanation is pretextual and can
create a needed record for the reviewing court-but it is not
the standard practice.
As part of the inquiry, courts also should determine
whether the prosecutor has engaged in any examination at
all, or only cursory examination, of the challenged black
juror. When prosecutors strike blacks after asking them
comparatively few substantive questions, courts should reject
explanations as not neutral. Conversely, courts should
determine whether the prosecutor questioned black and
white jurors disparately.314 For example, if the prosecutor
questions only black jurors about whether they know court
personnel, then the explanation should be rejected as
pretextual. Such disparate questioning indicates that the
prosecutor is fishing for an excuse to dismiss the juror. It
strongly suggests that the prosecutor is concerned less with
determining whether the jurors know court employees than
with finding an excuse to dismiss the black juror. Given the
prima facie inference of discrimination established against
the prosecutor, such disparate questioning should be enough
to reject the explanation.
The trial court should demand voir dire extensive enough
to ensure that black persons are not struck while white
persons with the same characteristics are asked to serve on
the jury. When a black person is questioned early in the voir
dire process, the trial judge can require the prosecutor to ask
all subsequent jurors, regardless of their race, those queries
314. Another writer also has emphasized the importance of comparing the extent
to which the prosecutor questions black and white venirepersons. Alan Raphael,
Discriminatory Jury Selection: Lower Court Implementation of Batson v. Kentucky,
25 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 293, 322-324 (1989). See also, e.g., State v. Smith, 791
S.W.2d 744, 750 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (allowing the explanation that the prosecutor
struck a black juror because she was old even though an older white juror was not
struck).
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that led to the striking of the black juror. Of course, it would
be more difficult for a judge to mandate this procedure when
the juror being challenged appears near the end of the venire
draw, as preceding white venire members would have been
questioned already and empaneled on the jury.
There are several possible solutions to this problem. First,
when a prosecutor strikes a black juror based on the juror's
answer to a series of questions, the trial judge can return to
the record to verify that the same series was addressed by
whites already selected for the jury. Although this method is
time-consuming, it would ensure that blacks and whites were
not treated differently.
Alternatively, the court can treat all selections and strikes
as tentative until a jury of twelve is determined. The trial
judge then can search the record, checking to see if a stricken
black was asked questions materially different from those
asked of accepted whites. If so, then the trial judge could
order the black venireperson to be placed on the jury in the
place of the last white juror accepted. This process could be
repeated for all black persons struck from the jury.315
As a third approach, the trial court could require the
lawyers to present in pretrial memoranda their criteria for
dismissing jurors. For example, a prosecutor who wished to
strike all prospective jurors of a young age would be required
to submit this factor to the trial court in advance of voir dire,
prior to having any information about the identity of the
persons on the jury venire. This requirement protects the
factual accuracy of the prosecutor's stated reasons for the
strikes, helping to ensure that the explanations are not post
hoc creations.
Without further refinement, this procedure could allow
prosecutors to choose criteria that correlate highly with
race-such as screening out persons who live in certain ra-
cially segregated neighborhoods or those of a lower socioe-
conomic class-thus enhancing prosecutors' opportunities to
use these criteria as proxies for race. The use of such criteria
nonetheless can be reduced by requiring the prosecutor to
315. A potential problem arises if the answers by a black and a white juror to
the same question differ such that different follow-up questions must be asked. In
such a case, the trial judge can determine whether the different questions are
material. If not, then the juror selection need not be disturbed. If the difference in
the questions is material, the court could then recall the relevant jurors to voir dire
and ask them the appropriate omitted questions.
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proffer not only the undesired factors but also the underlying
reasons why those characteristics would lead to a strike.
Hence, in our example above, the prosecutor might submit
his plan to strike relatively young jurors in a case where the
defendant is young and the victim middle-aged by explaining
that young jurors might be more likely to sympathize with a
defendant of comparable age. Demanding such a list is a
proactive way for a judge to determine whether other jurors
with characteristics similar to the challenged juror were not
struck, a clear indication of a Batson violation.
C. Connection With Group Bias
Explanations that prosecutors give for excluding black
jurors sometimes focus upon evidence that the juror belongs
to a particular nonracial group or classification of people.
Occasionally, the prosecutor will claim further that any given
member of this group is statistically more likely than the
average citizen to harbor a bias against the prosecutor's
case.316 Courts should reject such an explanation unless the
prosecutor (1) shows conclusively that the juror is indeed a
member of that class of individuals; (2) demonstrates good
reason to think that members of the group are more likely
prejudiced against the state's case; and (3) establishes that
the particular juror who was dismissed possessed the un-
desired characteristics.
For example, prosecutors commonly explain that they
struck a juror on the basis of unemployment.31 v Classification
in such a group should not by itself be enough to rebut the
prima facie inference of discrimination.31 s The prosecutor
should be required to articulate a reason why unemployment
is undesirable and show that the juror indicated a significant
connection to the unwanted characteristic during the voir
dire. In explaining why unemployment is undesirable,
316. See, e.g., ROBERT A. WENKE, THE ART OF SELECTING A JURY 77-78 (2d ed.
1989) (guiding practitioners in how to use stereotypes to predict biases of
venirepersons).
317. See supra Part III.B.3.
318. Unemployment is a particularly good example in this regard, given the high
black unemployment rate relative to that of whites. Consequently, lack of employ-
ment easily may be used as a pretext for a race-based strike.
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prosecutors often state that unemployed persons lack ties to
the community.319 In our view, courts should accept that
explanation only when the prosecutor has explored during
voir dire the struck juror's actual ties to the community,
apart from her employment status, and elicited some mini-
mal response that indicates a lack of community ties.
Without some record that the particular juror possess the
undesired characteristic ascribed to the group, courts should
not accept a strike based upon mere group status.
D. Relation to the Case
If the prosecutor's explanation is irrelevant to the facts of
the case at hand, it should be rejected. An explanation with
an unusually attenuated connection to the case at bar jus-
tifies the court in concluding that the prosecutor has likely
invented a post hoc rationale for a race-based strike.
As an example at one extreme, the prosecutor is surely
justified in keeping a venireperson off the jury when the
prospective juror knows a trial participant.3 0 Thus, in
Chisolm v. State,32 ' two jurors were struck because they knew
the defendant,322 and in Marks v. State,323 several jurors were
struck because they were either friends or a former partner
of the defense counsel.324 Actual previous involvement with
the criminal justice system is another rational reason for
striking a juror.325
At the other extreme, however, are cases in which the
prosecutor's reason for striking the juror is so unrelated to
the case at bar that it is likely that the prosecutor is motivat-
ed by nothing more than excluding blacks from the jury. For
instance, the Chisolm court also accepted the prosecutor's
explanation that he struck a juror because her husband
worked for a radio station that once aired a documentary
319. See supra note 119.
320. See supra Part III.B.6.
321. 529 So. 2d 630 (Miss. 1988).
322. Id. at 633.
323. 581 So. 2d 1182, 1187 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990).
324. Id. at 1187.
325. See, e.g., Spencer v. Commonwealth, 384 S.E.2d 785, 795 (Va. 1989) (invol-
ving a juror's criminal record which extended back 50 years), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
1093 (1990).
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unfavorable to law enforcement.3 26 There was no further
evidence of what job the husband performed at the radio
station or whether the juror herself held any views un-
favorable to law enforcement.327 One could probably establish
an equally attenuated connection to something undesirable to
virtually anyone. Accordingly, when an explanation is un-
usual or vague, courts should ask the prosecutor to explain
how it is linked to the cases. Prosecutors' scattershot claims,
akin to asserting that a juror "had been in trouble with the
law here,"328 should be valued no more than an assertion of
good faith; they should be rejected as failing to overcome the
presumption of discrimination.
VI. CONCLUSION
Race-based peremptory challenges still occur far too
frequently, but our analysis indicates that there are broad
patterns to prosecutors' discriminatory use of their
challenges. As shown in Part III, prosecutors often strike
blacks based on how they look, where they live, and who they
know, without showing how these attributes are at all
relevant to the case to be tried. These patterns can be used to
identify constitutional violations. Knowledge of the suspicious
justifications actually used provides an opportunity to help
Batson v. Kentucky fulfill its promise to eradicate dis-
criminatory uses of the peremptory challenge. By prohibiting
peremptory strikes which apply only to blacks, which only
vaguely concern the demeanor of jurors, which employ
illegitimate group biases targeted at minority jurors, and
which relate only tenuously to the case at hand, the voir dire
process can work more fairly and effectively.
With improvements such as those suggested in Part V, the
basic framework established in Batson can reduce discrimina-
tion while simultaneously retaining peremptory challenges as
part of the criminal justice system.329 Even if courts were to
326. Chisolm, 529 So. 2d at 638-39.
327. Id. at 638-39.
328. Baker v. State, 555 So. 2d 273, 275 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989).
329. Many observers of the criminal justice system advocate the abolition of
peremptory challenges altogether, arguing that they allow too much discretion
unchecked for racism. See e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 108 (1986) (Marshall,
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evaluate neutral explanations more critically, as we suggest,
prosecutors would still retain their traditional ability to
challenge jurors. 330 After all, it is not until a prima facie case
of discrimination has been proven that prosecutors must offer
an explanation to the court. We present our suggestions with
an eye toward allowing trial lawyers to maintain most of
their traditional influence upon the jury selection process. We
simply believe that the inference of discrimination
established under Batson demands greater restrictions than
those placed by most courts today upon allegedly "neutral"
explanations.
J., concurring) ("If the prosecution's peremptory challenge could be eliminated only
at the cost of eliminating defendant's challenge as well, I do not think that would be
too great a price to pay" to end racial discrimination in jury selection.); Albert W.
Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges, and
the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 157 (1989) ("Arbitrary exclusions
from jury service have no place in a constitutional system grounded on concepts of
equality and individual worth.") Although this idea has great force, we consider it
unrealistic at the present time. Given that Batson is the law and that there is little
indication that Congress, the states, or the Supreme Court are likely. to ban
peremptory challenges in the near future, the challenge for those who wish to
eradicate discrimination injury selection is not to malign Batson but to develop ways
to make it work.
330. Defense counsel would also retain their right to make peremptory
challenges.

